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ABSTRACT
Shimao, Hajime PhD, Purdue University, August 2018. Essays on Structural Econometric
Modeling and Machine Learning. Major Professor: Ralph Siebert.
This dissertation is composed of three independent chapters relating the theory and
empirical methodology in economics to machine learning and important topics in information age . The ﬁrst chapter raises an important problem in structural estimation and
provide a solution to it by incorporating a culture in machine learning. The second chapter
investigates a problem of statistical discrimination in big data era. The third chapter studies
the implication of information uncertainty in the security software market.
Structural estimation is a widely used methodology in empirical economics, and a large
class of structural econometric models are estimated through the generalized method of
moments (GMM). Traditionally, a model to be estimated is chosen by researchers based on
their intuition on the model, and the structural estimation itself does not directly test it from
the data. In other words, not sufﬁcient amount of attention is paid to devise a principled
method to verify such an intuition. In the ﬁrst chapter, we propose a model selection for
GMM by using cross-validation, which is widely used in machine learning and statistics
communities. We prove the consistency of the cross-validation. The empirical property of
the proposed model selection is compared with existing model selection methods by Monte
Carlo simulations of a linear instrumental variable regression and oligopoly pricing model.
In addition, we propose the way to apply our method to Mathematical Programming of
Equilibrium Constraint (MPEC) approach. Finally, we perform our method to online-retail
sales data to compare dynamic model to static model.
In the second chapter, we study a fair machine learning algorithm that avoids a statistical
discrimination when making a decision. Algorithmic decision making process now affects
many aspects of our lives. Standard tools for machine learning, such as classiﬁcation and

xi
regression, are subject to the bias in data, and thus direct application of such off-the-shelf
tools could lead to a speciﬁc group being statistically discriminated. Removing sensitive
variables such as race or gender from data does not solve this problem because a disparate
impact can arise when non-sensitive variables and sensitive variables are correlated. This
problem arises severely nowadays as bigger data is utilized, it is of particular importance
to invent an algorithmic solution. Inspired by the two-stage least squares method that is
widely used in the ﬁeld of economics, we propose a two-stage algorithm that removes
bias in the training data. The proposed algorithm is conceptually simple. Unlike most of
existing fair algorithms that are designed for classiﬁcation tasks, the proposed method is
able to (i) deal with regression tasks, (ii) combine explanatory variables to remove reverse
discrimination, and (iii) deal with numerical sensitive variables. The performance and
fairness of the proposed algorithm are evaluated in simulations with synthetic and realworld datasets.
The third chapter examines the issue of information uncertainty in the context of information security. Many users lack the ability to correctly estimate the true quality of the
security software they purchase, as evidenced by some anecdotes and even some academic
research. Yet, most of the analytical research assumes otherwise. Hence, we were motivated to incorporate this “false sense of security” behavior into a game-theoretic model
and study the implications on welfare parameters. Our model features two segments of
consumers, well- and ill-informed, and the monopolistic software vendor. Well-informed
consumers observe the true quality of the security software, while the ill-informed ones
overestimate. While the proportion of both segments are known to the software vendor,
consumers are uncertain about the segment they belong to. We ﬁnd that, in fact, the level of
the uncertainty is not necessarily harmful to society. Furthermore, there exist some extreme
circumstances where society and consumers could be better off if the security software did
not exist. Interestingly, we also ﬁnd that the case where consumers know the information
structure and weight their expectation accordingly does not always lead to optimal social
welfare. These results contrast with the conventional wisdom and are crucially important
in developing appropriate policies in this context.

1

1. CROSS VALIDATION BASED MODEL SELECTION VIA
GENERALIZED METHOD OF MOMENTS
1.1 Introduction
Structural estimation of economic models is one of the most widely used methodologies in empirical economics nowadays in variety of ﬁelds.Structural estimation enables
researchers to interpret latent variable, as well as it allows researchers to perform counterfactual simulations. Arguably, however, one of the largest shortcoming in the structural
estimation procedure lies in the selection of a proper model. That is, the speciﬁcation
of estimation models is usually chosen by researchers and implementation of structural
estimation itself does not directly address on it from the data, because the estimation is
performed by assuming the model reﬂects the true data generating process ((Angrist and
Pischke, 2010)). On a paper it is a common practice for economists to verbally argue
and defend their model speciﬁcation in a descriptive way. However, since the validity of
the counterfactual simulation crucially depends on the goodness of the model, verifying
and choosing a proper model empirically is of particular importance. Especially, we often
simplify a model for the ease of tractability: Such simpliﬁcations is preferred to be subject
to some assessment.
When a structural model is estimated in economics, researchers often use generalized
method of moments (GMM) as well as maximum likelihood. As to selecting a true model,
(Smith, 1992) and (Rivers and Vuong, 2002) offer a model selection procedure for GMM
based on the difference of empirical moments. Their core idea is a simple use of the
GMM minimand as a ﬁtness of the model with the observed data: That is, to select the
model of the smallest GMM minimand when it is estimated1 . Although such a procedure is
1

The theory provided in (Rivers and Vuong, 2002) applies to broader range of model selection criteria.
However, it is often implemented as GMM minimand comparison. See (Bonnet and Dubois, 2010) or (Berto
Villas-Boas, 2007) for example.

2
asymptotically consistent in choosing a true or ”better” model, the performance of model
selection with limited sample size is still uncertain. In some applications, economists have
to make an inference from a relatively small number of observations. Given a limited size
of the sample, their procedures may be subject to ”over-ﬁtting”: excessively complicated
models can ﬁt tighter to the observations in hand with better ”goodness-of-ﬁt” criterion,
and thus is selected as a better model even if the model is not very true.
To avoid over-ﬁtting problem, some model selection criteria such as AIC-GMM or
BIC-GMM ”penalize” the number of parameters in a model ((Andrews, 1999)). However,
the complexity of economic models is not simply measured by the number of parameters.
Structural model may include non-parametric components in speciﬁcation (e.g., (Gautier
and Kitamura, 2013)), where we cannot apply a penalization based on number of parameters. Additionally, estimation procedure sometimes involves nonparametric approximation only for certain models. For example, estimation of dynamic demand model in
(Gowrisankaran and Rysman, 2012) includes a nonparametric approximation of a value
function, which may make their model more ﬂexible than static demand model. To date,
it is not well understood how these factors contribute to the over-ﬁtting issue nor how to
penalize its ﬂexibility.
In this paper, we offer a novel approach to this problem that helps researchers to identify
the best model speciﬁcation from the data. Our idea is to apply the cross-validation (CV)
method, which is commonly used in other areas such as machine learning, in evaluating the
predictive power of the model. The main idea behind cross-validation is to split the data
into several portions so that test of a model ﬁt is implemented on a different data from the
one used for estimating parameters. As a result, the estimated moment suffers a smaller
over-ﬁtting than in-sample model selection.
The largest advantage of sample splitting lies in its wide range of potential applications.
On applying CV, one does not need to take the number of model parameters explicitly. As
a result, it can select the true model among parametric, non-parametric and even semiparametric models. Moreover, CV can be applied not only in selecting models, but also
selecting hyper-parameters of estimation and even estimation method itself. For example,

3
estimation of dynamic model often includes approximation of value function on a discrete
grid space, where the coarseness of the grid space has not been paid adequate attention
though it heavily inﬂuences the performance of estimation. As to the example of estimation
method, random coefﬁcient demand system can be estimated in various speciﬁcations, such
as parametric or non-parametric, through various methodologies such as nested ﬁxed point
algorithm or constrained optimization approach (MPEC, (Su and Judd, 2012)) and they
may yield different results especially in limited sample size.
Economists typically evaluate estimation techniques and model speciﬁcation by checking how the true parameters are recovered in a Monte-Carlo simulation. However, the best
speciﬁcation or methodology may vary across different data or the ”true” data generating
process that researchers do not observe. Thus, it is preferable to make an assessment in
real-world data as well, and CV offers a practical approach to that end. Taking a wide
range of applications into consideration, conducting CV in selecting models deserves a
signiﬁcant portion of attention.
Although CV is commonly used in data science ﬁelds such as machine learning and data
mining, its applicability to economic models is not obvious. In machine learning and data
mining, the primal concern lies in how accurate the prediction of a regressor or classiﬁer
is. Meanwhile, in empirical economics, identifying the model reﬂecting the reality closer
and estimating its model parameters are of primal concern, and machine learning literature
does not provide a sufﬁcient guarantee in identiﬁcation of a model. This gap remains to be
closed in applying data science methods in econometrics. Taking this into consideration,
we propose an identiﬁable CV method for GMM.
We ﬁrst prove the consistency of cross-validation algorithm: That is, the algorithm
identiﬁes a correctly speciﬁed model from misspeciﬁed models with the probability approaching to 1 as the number of data increases. When a model is estimated through
likelihood maximization, (Yang, 2007) proved the consistency of the cross-validation in
non-parametric regression model selection. We prove an analogous result for GMM version
of CV algorithm.

4
After giving the consistency, we test the performance of our cross-validation algorithm
with a limited number of samples by Monte-Carlo simulation. Firstly, we examine a simple
instrumental variable regression. We observe our algorithm selects a correctly speciﬁed
mode over a misspeciﬁed model with high probability even when data size is limited.
Importantly, our algorithm ﬁnds the correctly speciﬁed model even when the alternative
model has higher ﬂexibility (i.e., more parameters) than the true model, suggesting that it
is robust to over-ﬁtting. Furthermore, we compare the performance of our algorithm with
Rivers-Vuong type GMM minimand comparison approach and also approaches based on
GMM-AIC and GMM-BIC criteria that (Andrews, 1999) suggested. The result implies
that the comparison of GMM minimand suffers over-ﬁtting, and as a result it often selects
a misspeciﬁed model of higher complexities. Though GMM-AIC and GMM-BIC based
approaches attempt to solve the over-ﬁtting problem by penalizing the ﬂexibility of model,
their performance turns out to be extremely sensitive to the model speciﬁcation, and as a
result, they often fail to ﬁnd the correctly speciﬁed model.
Secondly, we conduct another experiment in more complex nonlinear models. We use
a collusive pricing model similar to the ones of (Bresnahan, 1987) and (Hu et al., 2014),
where their objective of model selection is to detect a potential tacit collusion from the
sales and price data. We simulate the price and quantity data from perfectly competitive
setting and partially collusive setting, and test if our algorithm discovers the true conduct
or not. We show that our cross-validation procedure generally perform well to identify the
true pricing structure from a limited amount of data. We show how CV outperforms the
simple GMM ﬁtting comparison without data split.
In addition, we propose a method to apply cross-validation algorithm when estimation is based on Mathematical Programming of Equilibrium Constraint (MPEC) approach.
MPEC is proposed by (Su and Judd, 2012) and is one of the state-of-the-art estimation
methodologies. MPEC achieves high computational efﬁciency by avoiding the nested
ﬁxed point algorithm, and its convenience is earning signiﬁcant attention especially in the
industrial organization research community. Though application of CV to MPEC is not
straightforward, we provide a modiﬁed algorithm of CV applicable to MPEC estimation.

5
Finally, we perform our algorithm on a cutting-edge structural model with real-world
data. The model we adopt is dynamic demand and dynamic pricing model of (Conlon,
2012). The dynamic models are considered to be the recent frontier of the industrial
organization community and used in many applications (such as (Lee, 2013)). However,
the superiority of the dynamic models compared with static models on its explainability of
the consumer behavior is not sufﬁciently supported. Likewise, the dynamic pricing model
is a frontier research topic in the industrial organization ((Nair, 2007),(Luo, 2015)), but its
empirical support against static model is only descriptive. We apply our CV algorithm to
the market data of an online retailer based in the UK to test dynamic models against static
models. We show that the results are mixed across different products, even though they are
sold by the same retailer.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we formally introduce cross-validation
in GMM and discuss its econometric property. In particular, we prove its asymptotic
consistency. In Section 3, we demonstrate a Monte-Carlo experiment of model selection
in IV regression. In Section 4, we perform a further experiment in an oligopolistic pricing
model as a nonlinear example. Section 5 explains how we can modify the algorithm when
it is applied to MPEC approach. Section 6 presents the setup and results of the real-world
application of the dynamic pricing model using online-retailer data. Section 7 concludes
the paper.

1.2

Cross-validation Approach to GMM Model Selection

1.2.1 Setup
Let v = {vt } be a random vector of observed data in V ⊂ Rd . Let Mi for i = 1, 2 be
the two candidate models to explain the observed data. Each model, if correctly speciﬁed,
is characterized by a set of moment conditions f (i) : V × Θ(i) → Rqi such that
(i)

(i)

Mi ⇒ E[f (i) (vt , θ0 )] = 0 for a unique θ0 ∈ Θ(i)
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where θ(i) ∈ Θ(i) denotes the parameters of a model i to be estimated. Let pi be the
dimension of θ(i) . Given the observation {vt }t=1,,,T , the parameters of each model are
estimated via GMM;
(i)
(i)
θˆT = arg min QT (θ(i) )

(1.1)

θ (i) ∈Θ(i)

where
(i)

QT (θ(i) ) =

1
T

T

f (i) (vt , θ(i) )

(i)

WT

t=1

1
T

T

f (i) (vt , θ(i) ) .
t=1

(i)

Let plimWT = W (i) , and the population analogue of the moment conditions be
T →∞

(i)

Q0 (θ(i) ) = E[f (i) (vt , θ(i) )] W (i) E[f (i) (vt , θ(i) )].
(i)

(i)

Assume that plimθT = θ0 exists. The null hypothesis is that M1 and M2 are asymptotiT →∞

cally equivalent;
(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

H0 : Q0 (θ0 ) = Q0 (θ0 ).
Two alternative hypotheses are that M1 is asymptotically better than M2 or the other way
around;
(a)

(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

(b)

(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

H1 = Q0 (θ0 ) < Q0 (θ0 ),
H1 = Q0 (θ0 ) > Q0 (θ0 ).

1.2.2

Cross-validation

Cross-validation is a model selection procedure in which the data is split into two
subsets called training set and validation set. The set of parameters of each model is
estimated in the training set, and its goodness is evaluated with the validation set. Let
r ≥ 2, k < r be integers. In leave-k-out r-fold cross-validation ((k, r)-CV), we ﬁrst split
T datapoints into r disjoint subsets. At each round of CV, We use r − k of them as the
training data, and the other k as the validation data. Multiple number of rounds among
possible splits are performed to reduce variability.
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Namely, let
NTj,r = { T (j − 1)/r + 1, T (j − 1)/r + 2, . . . , T j/r }
be the indices of the j-th split. Let {S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , r} : |S| = r − k} and
NS =

NTj,r
j∈S

be subset of datapoints consisted of folds in S. The moment on this datapoints is denoted
as
(i)

QS (θ(i) ) =

1
f (i) (vt , θ(i) )
|NS | t∈N

1
f (i) (vt , θ(i) ) ,
|NS | t∈N

(i)

WS

S

S

and the model trained to minimize the moment is denoted as
(i)
(i)
θˆS = arg min QS (θ(i) ).
θ (i) ∈Θ(i)

Once the model is trained, it is validated by the rest of datapoints as:
⎧
⎫
⎧
⎫
⎬
⎬
1
1
(i)
(i)
(i)
(i)
(i)
(i)
(i)
ˆ
f (vt , θ̂S ) WS
f (vt , θ̂S ) ,
QS,valid (θS ) =
⎩ |N\S |
⎭
⎩ |N\S |
⎭
t∈N
t∈N
\S

\S

where N\S = {1, . . . , T } \ NS . In (k, r)-CV, the averaged validation score of each model
(i)

Qvalid =

1
r Ck

(i)

(i)

QS,valid (θ̂S )
S⊂{1,2,...,r}:|S|=r−k

is compared, and the model of smaller averaged validation score is selected. The procedure
is summarized in Algorithm 1.

1.2.3

Consistency of CV in Model Selection

In this section, we derive the consistency of CV in GMM model selection. Let one of
the models is misspeciﬁed. Without loss of generality, we assume the ﬁrst model is the true
model2 . The true model satisﬁes the following moment condition:
(1)

E[f (1) (vt , θ0 )] = 0.
2

Of course, the model selection method should not exploit this fact.
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The latter model is assumed to be misspeciﬁed: that is, for any θ(2) the following holds:
E[f (2) (vt , θ(2) )] > 0.
The misspeciﬁcation is divided into two local and non-local ones (Hall, 2005).
Assumption 1.2.1 The false model is globally misspeciﬁed if there exists μ(θ) such that
||μ(θ)|| > 0 and
inf

θ (2) ∈Θ(2)

E f (2) (vt , θ(2) ) = μ(θ).

Alternatively, we can make a weaker assumption that the sample moment of the misspeciﬁed model converges to zero slower than that of the true model. This assumption covers
cases where the misspeciﬁed model is more general (or too general) than the true model.
This is the case, for example, the utility function in the true model is a linear function of
price but the misspeciﬁed model incorporates higher order polynomials.
Assumption 1.2.2 The false model is said to be locally misspeciﬁed if, for every ∈ (0, 1),
(1)

(2)

there exists c > 0 such that, when T is sufﬁciently large, P [Qvalid < Qvalid ] ≥ 1 − .
Note that, in either deﬁnition of misspeciﬁcation, the researcher does not know which
model is true, and our interest lies in consistently choosing the true model over a misspeciﬁed model based on the dataset.
In the previous literature, Smith (1992) offers a pairwise comparison process for consistent model selection. However, it has some practical disadvantages when applied to
empirical research: (i) A pairwise comparison could be extremely demanding if the space
of candidate models is large, and (ii) it may be subject to over-ﬁtting problem. To avoid
those issues, the most common practice in the ﬁeld of machine learning is to apply crossvalidation (CV) algorithm. In the literature in statistics, Yang (2006,2007) have shown that
even the simplest CV procedure can ﬁnd a true model consistently when the data structure
is regression form, i.e. yi = f (xi ) + i . Likewise to the literature, we deﬁne a consistent
model selection as below:
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Deﬁnition 1.2.1 Assume that model 1 is correct while model 2 is wrong in a sense that it is
globally misspeciﬁed. A selection rule is said to be consistent if the probability of selecting
model 1 approaches 1 as T −→ ∞.
To derive the consistency of CV, we deﬁne the following assumptions.
Assumption 1.2.3 (strict stationarity) v = {vt } is a strictly stationary process.
Assumption 1.2.4 (regularity condition) Let f (i) (vt , θ) and its population analogue E[f (i) (vt , θ)]
be continuous on θ(i) for each vt . Let Θ(i) be compact and E[supθ(i) ∈Θ(i) f (i) (vt , θ)] be
bounded.
Assumption 1.2.5 (ergodicity) v = {vt } is an ergodic process.
Assumption 1.2.6 (identiﬁcation condition) Let
(i)

∂f (i) (vt , θ0 )
E
∂θ(i)
have rank d.
In the following we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1.2.1 Let Assumptions 1.2.3–1.2.6 hold. Then, (r, k)-CV is consistent.

Proof of Theorem 1.2.1
We ﬁrst states lemmas that are proven in (Hall, 2005), and by using them we prove the
theorem.
Lemma 1.2.1 (Consistency of the estimator in the correct model, Theorem 3.1 in (Hall,
2005)) Let S ⊂ {1, . . . , r}, |S| = r − k be any split in (k, r)-CV, and model 1 be correctly
speciﬁed. Let Assumptions 1.2.3–1.2.6 hold. Then,
(1)
(1)
θˆS →p θ0

as T /r → ∞.

(1.2)
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Lemma 1.2.2 (Property of a globally misspeciﬁed estimator, Theorem 5.2 in (Hall, 2005))
Let S ⊂ {1, . . . , r}, |S| = r − k be any split in (k, r)-CV. Let Assumptions 1.2.3–1.2.6
hold. Then, here exists c > 0 such that
(i)

p

(i)

Q0 (θ̂S ) → c

(1.3)

as T /r → ∞.
Lemma 1.2.3 (Uniform convergence of the moment, Lemma 3.1 in (Hall, 2005)) Let
Assumptions 1.2.3–1.2.6 hold. Then,
(i)

(1)

p

(2)

(2)

p

sup |QS,valid (θ(1) ) − Q0 (θ(1) )| → 0

(1.4)

θ (1) ∈Θ(1)

sup |QS,valid (θ(2) ) − Q0 (θ(2) )| → 0

(1.5)

θ (2) ∈Θ(2)

Proof [Proof of Theorem 1.2.1] We show that,
p

(1)

sup |Qvalid | → 0

(1.6)

θ (1) ∈Θ(1)

and there exists c > 0 such that
p

(2)

|Qvalid | → c

(1.7)

which imply Theorem 1.2.1. First,
(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)

|Qvalid − Q0 (θ0 )| ≤

(1)

(1)

(1)

|QS,valid (θ̂S ) − Q0 (θ0 )|
S∈{1,...,r}:|S|=r−k
(1)

≤

(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)

|QS,valid (θ̂S ) − Q0 (θ̂S )| + |Q0 (θ̂S ) − Q0 (θ0 )|
S∈{1,...,r}:|S|=r−k

Inequality (1.4) implies the ﬁrst term converges to zero in probability, and the second term
converges to zero in probability by (1.2). In other words,
(1)

(1)

(1)

p

|Qvalid (θ(1) ) − Q0 (θ0 )| → 0

(1.8)

and by Assumption 3.3 in (Hall, 2005),
(1)

(1)

Q0 (θ0 ) = 0

(1.9)
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and thus inequality (1.6) is derived. We next show (1.7). We have,
(2)

Qvalid
(2)

(2)

≥ Q0 (θ0 ) −

1
r Ck

(2)

(2)

(2)

(2)

(2)

(2)

(2)

(2)

|QS,valid (θ̂S ) − Q0 (θ̂S )| − |Q0 (θ̂S ) − Q0 (θ0 )| ,
S∈{1,...,r}:|S|=r−k

where the ﬁrst term of the RHS converges to c > 0 in probability by (1.2). The second term
converge to zero in probability by (1.5). The third term goes to zero in probability by our
assumption. Therefore (1.7) holds.

1.2.4 Statistical testing
This section proposes a statistical hypothesis testing on our CV-based model selection.
Let

(1)

RCV =

(2)

|NS |1/2 (Qvalid − Qvalid )
σ̂ 2

be the test statistics that indicates either the ﬁrst or the second hypothesis is better than the
other. Here, σ̂ 2 is the estimator of the limiting variance σ02 of RCV . The null hypothesis of
the test is
(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

H0 : Q0 (θ0 ) = Q0 (θ0 ).
These are two alternative hypotheses of interest: The ﬁrst one indicates M1 is better than
M2 . That is,
(a)

(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

H1 : Q0 (θ0 ) < Q0 (θ0 )
and the second one indicates M2 is better than M2 :
(b)

(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

H1 : Q0 (θ0 ) > Q0 (θ0 ).
Following (Rivers and Vuong, 2002; Hall and Pelletier, 2011), we discuss conditions where
the statistics RCV is asymptotically normal. We ﬁrst consider the testing statistics in the
general case in Section 1.2.4. Moreover, we show in the case the dependency among
splits are sufﬁciently small in Section 1.2.4, where the statistics is represented in a much
computationally efﬁcient way.
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We pose the following assumption on the structure of the weight matrix that is essentially the same as (Hall and Pelletier, 2011):
Assumption 1.2.7 (parameterization of the weight matrix) Let W (i) depends on a vector
(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

nuisance parameter τ0 and τ̂S is the estimator of τ0 as W (i) = W (i) (τ0 ) and WS =
(i)

(i)

WS (τ̂S ). It is assumed that the nuisance parameter satisﬁes
|NS |1/2 (τ̂S − τ0 ) = −A(i) |NS |−1/2
(i)

(i)

(i)

Yt

+ op (1)

t∈NS
(i)

for some symmetric matrix of constants A

(i)

and data-dependent vector Yt , and the weight

matrix satisﬁes
(i)

(i)

(i)

|NS |1/2 vech[WS ] − vech[W (i) ] = Δ(i) |NS |1/2 (τ̂S − τ0 ) + op (1)
for some matrix of constants Δ(i) .
To discuss statistical testing, we need to have asymptotic normality property. The
following assumption guarantees that the moment is “well-behaved” around the optimal
(i)

value θ0 .
Assumption 1.2.8 (regularity condition on derivative)
• The derivatie matrix ∂f (i) (v, θ(i) )/∂θ(i) exists and is continuous on Θ(i) for each v.
(i)

• θ0 lies in the interior of Θ(i) .
(i)

• E[∂f (i) (v, θ0 )/∂θ(i) ] exists and is ﬁnite.
(i)

• E[∂f (i) (v, θ(i) )/∂θ(i) ] continuous on some neighborhood N of θ0 .
• supθ(i) ∈N ||(1/T )

T
t=1

p

∂f (i) (v, θ(i) )/∂θ(i) − E[∂f (i) (v, θ(i) )/∂θ(i) ]|| → 0.

For the ease of discussion, we further add the following notation. Let FS = |N\S |−1/2
(i)

(i)
Let G0

= E[∂f (i) (vt , θ(i) )/∂θ(i) ],

(i)
and its empirical counterpart be GS

= |NS |−1

t∈N\S (∂f

Let {S1 , . . . , Sr Ck } = {S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , r} : |S| = r − k} be the set of all splits. We also
denote θ = (θ(1) , θ(2) ), and θ0 and θ̂S are deﬁned in the same way.

t∈N\S {f
(i)

(i)

(vt ,

(vt , θ(i) )/∂
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General splitting
Then, V is the

⎛
c1,1

···

c1,2

⎜
⎜
⎜ c2,1
c2,2 · · ·
V =⎜
⎜ ..
..
..
.
⎜ .
.
⎝
cr Ck ,1 cr Ck ,2 · · ·
where cj,j is a submatrix such that
⎛
⎜
cj,j = lim Cov ⎝
T →∞

t (θ)

c2,r Ck
..
.

⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠

cr Ck ,r Ck

⎞

t (θ0 ),

t∈N\Sj

⎞
c1,r Ck

t
t ∈N\S

⎟
(θ0 )⎠

j

(1)

= f (1) (vt , θ(1) ) − E[f (1) (vt , θ(1) ] , Yt

(2)

, f (2) (vt , θ(2) ) − E[f (2) (vt , θ(2) )] , Yt

.

Moreover,
R = R(1) , R(2) , R(1) , R(2) , . . . , R(1) , R(2)
⎡
⎤
(i)
(1)
(1)
2W
E[f
(v
,
θ
)]
t
⎦
R(i) = ⎣
(i) (i)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
−A Δ Bi E[f (vt , θ )] ⊗ E[f (vt , θ )]
where Bi is the qi2 × qi (qi + 1)/2 matrix such that vec(W (i) ) = Bi vech(W (i) ).
Assumption 1.2.9

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

1. Assume that [FS1 , FS1 , FS2 , FS2 , . . . , FSr C , FSr C ] → N (0, Σ(θ)).
k

k

Where Σ(θ) is a positive semi-deﬁnite matrix of constants.
(i)

2. rank{G0 } = d.
(i)

3. S 1/2 (θ̂S − θ(i) ) = Op (1).
ˆ θˆS ) → Σ(θ0 ).
4. The empirical estimator of each Σ(θ) converges as Σ(
Theorem 1.2.2 (asymptotic normality of RCV ) Assume that both models M1 and M2 are
misspeciﬁed. Assume that Assumption 1.2.9 holds. Assume Assumptions 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5,
and 1.2.8 hold. Assume that the null hypothesis H0 holds. Let W (i) = Iqi . Then,
RCV → N (0, 1).
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Remark 1.2.1 Theorem 1.2.2 poses the assumption that both models are misspeciﬁed.
As discussed in (Hall and Pelletier, 2011), this assumption is essential: One can check
that, under correctly speciﬁed models, the distribution of RCV does not have asymptotic
normality.
Remark 1.2.2 As discussed in (Hall and Inoue, 2003) a constant weight matrix has the
best rate of convergence in misspeciﬁed models and thus the assumption of identity W (i) in
Theorem 1.2.2 is reasonable.
Proof [Proof of Theorem 1.2.2] The theorem is an extension of Theorem 1 in (Hall and
(i)

(i)

Pelletier, 2011) to multiple splitting. The mean value theorem applied to QS,valid (θ̂S )
(i)

around θ0 , we obtain

⎧

QS,valid (θˆS ) = QS,valid (θ0 ) +
(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

⎫
⎬

(i)
∂QS,valid (θ(i) )
⎩
∂θ(i)

⎭
¯(i)

(i)

(i)

(θ̂S − θ0 )

θ (i) =θS

(i)

where θ̄S = λS θ0 + (1 − λS )θ̂S for some λS ∈ [0, 1]. Let
(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

Φ(i) (θ0 ) = 2G0 (θ0 ) W (i) E[f (i) (vt , θ0 )].
From our assumptions, we obtain
∂ θˆS
∂θ(i)
(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

QS,valid (θ̂S ) = QS,valid (θ0 ) +

(θ̂S − θ0 ) + op (|N\S |−1/2 ),
(i)

(i)

and thus
(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

|N\S |1/2 [QS,valid (θ̂S ) − QS,valid (θ̂S )] = |N\S |1/2 [QS,valid (θ0 ) − QS,valid (θ0 )]
(1)

(1)
(1)
S 1/2 (θˆS − θ0 )

(2)

(2)
(2)
S 1/2 (θˆS − θ0 )

+ Φ(1) (θ0 )
− Φ(2) (θ0 )
+ op (1).

(1.10)

Note that the GMM estimator minimizes the moment condition, which implies GS (θ̂S ) WS (1/|N\S |−1 )
(i)

(i)

(i)

0. This fact implies the third and fourth terms of (1.11) vanishes. Namely,
(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

(1)

(2)

|N\S |1/2 [QS,valid (θ̂S ) − QS,valid (θ̂S )] = |N\S |1/2 [QS,valid (θ(1) ) − QS,valid (θ(2) )]
+ op (1).

(1.11)
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With the choice W (i) = Iqi for the weighting matrix, and by using the symmetry of the
moment we obtain
(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

|N\S |1/2 [QS,valid (θ̂S ) − QS,valid (θ̂S )] =
2 μ(1) (θ0 )|N\S |−1/2
(1)

(1)

(1)

[f (1) (vt , θ0 ) − μ(1) (θ0 )]
t∈N\S

− μ(2) (θ0 )|N\S |−1/2
(2)

(2)

(2)

[f (2) (vt , θ0 ) − μ(2) (θ0 )]

+ op (1),

t∈N\S

which, combined with our assumptions, completes the proof.

When dependency among validation splits is small
Calculating the asymptotic variance of Theorem 1.2.2 requires a calculation of a matrix
with its size proportional to the number of splits, which in some cases is computationally
prohibitive. This section consider the case where the dependency between the validation
data is sufﬁciently small. In such a case, we can circumvent the computation of a large
matrix.
In particular, the leave-one-out CV (special case of our CV with k = 1) when each datapoint is identically and independently distributed (i.i.d), the following assumption holds:

Assumption 1.2.10 Assume that each validation split {N\Sj } is independent and identically distributed.
Theorem 1.2.3 (asymptotic normality of RCV , Leave-one-out) Let assumptions in Theorem 1.2.2 hold. Let Assumption 1.2.10 holds. Then, the limit variance is written as
σ2 =

Rsingle V single (S)Rsingle
S∈{S⊂{1,2,...,r}:|S|=r−k}
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where
Rsingle = R(1) , R(2)
⎡
Rsingle,(i) = ⎣

2W E[f
(i)

(1)

(vt , θ )]
(1)

(i)

−A Δ(i) Bi E[f (1) (vt , θ(1) )] ⊗ E[f (1) (vt , θ(1) )]

V single (S) = lim Var(
T →∞

t)

⎤
⎦
(1.12)

t∈N\S

And The asymptotic normality holds:
RCV → N (0, 1).
The proof of Theorem 1.2.10 directly follows by following the same steps as Theorem 1.2.2
with additional fact that Assumption (1.2.10) implies the block-diagonal property of V as
ci,j → 0 for i = j and the identity of each block.

1.3

Monte-Carlo Experiments in Linear Model
In this section we present a simple simulation of instrumental variables (IV) regression

models to illustrate the consistency of our cross-validation algorithm of model selection.
This example also highlights how GMM-minimand-based model comparison and crossvalidation can exhibit different results. The setting is similar to the one on (?). Suppose the
true data generating process is
y = X1 β 1 + X2 β 2 + Z2 α + ,
where y is a T × 1 vector and X1 and X2 are T × p1 and T × p2 matrix respectively. X1
and X2 are generated from instrumental variables as
X 1 = Z1 δ 1 + ξ 1 ,
X2 = Z 2 δ 2 + ξ 2 ,
where Z1 and Z2 are T × c1 and T × c2 matrix respectively.
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We consider a case where we have two candidate models to compare. The ﬁrst model
exploits the explanatory variables X1 and instrumental variables Z1 .
M1 :y = X1 β +

1

,

2

,

E[Z1 1 ] = 0,
whereas the second model employs X2 and Z2 ;
M2 :y = X2 β +
E[Z2 2 ] = 0.
Each model has different explanatory variables as well as the set of instrumental variables so that two models are non-nested. In addition, there are two important differences
between the two candidates. First, the second model can be ”misspeciﬁed” when α = 0, because the instrumental variables Z2 inﬂuences y directly and thus IVs are not independent
from

2

. When |α| > 0 and does not decrease with the number of observations, i.e. α = 10,

it is globally misspeciﬁed, which results in inconsistent estimates of the parameters.
The second difference is that the number of the variables. In the following, we assume
that p1 ≤ p2 , meaning that the second model has a larger number of explanatory variables.
As discussed earlier, this may cause ”over-ﬁtting” issue to the estimation even if the model
is falsely speciﬁed. In such a case, previous literature proposes the ways to penalize the
model by the number of parameters ((Andrews, 1999)). We compare the performance of
the proposed method with the ones of those existing methods in the later section.
Though this example may seem to be somewhat arbitrary, similar problems arise in
many situations when econometric models are compared. Speciﬁcally, one model can be
ﬂexible (or even ”over ﬂexible”) but misspeciﬁed, while the other is simpler but accurate.
Some researchers may not value the simplicity, but they would prefer a ”correctly speciﬁed”
model than misspeciﬁed models. For example, think of a case where economists try to
explain wage from education and other variables, where education is endogenous and has
to be proxied by IVs. The misspeciﬁed model includes incorrect IVs that gives bias to
the estimate of the coefﬁcient. Even if one model exhibits a good ﬁt to the data, if the
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coefﬁcient of interest is not properly estimated, such a model does not serve well for labor
economists. In those occasions, our algorithm serves to help researchers to ﬁnd the most
”correct” model. Our method is general enough so that any speciﬁcation can be compared.

1.3.1 Results
First we consider the case where over-ﬁtting is a concern as the misspeciﬁed model has
more parameters therefore could exhibit better ﬁt to the data. We compare our methodology
in this case to the model selection procedures proposed by (Andrews, 1999) as well as
simple GMM comparison as in the previous section. (Andrews, 1999) deﬁnes GMM-AIC
and GMM-BIC criterion as
(i)

GMM-AIC: T QT (θTi ) − 2(|ci | − pi );
(i)

GMM-BIC: T QT (θTi ) − (|ci | − pi )lnT,
for i = 1, 2. The procedure chooses the model that exhibits smaller value of the criterion.
Figure 1.1 shows the empirical probability of choosing the correctly speciﬁed model by
cross-validation. One can see that, even when the model 2 has larger number of variables,
it chooses the model 1 with very high chance even when the data is limited. When the
bias parameter of the model 2 α is as large as 12., it selects the ﬁrst model with probability
91.2% even when the data size is only 100 and the second model has 9 variables compared
to 3 of the ﬁrst model.
On the other hand, model selection based on in-sample moment performs extremely
poorly when the misspeciﬁed model has much more variables than the ﬁrst model. When
p2 = 9, even with data size 1600 the accuracy is as bad as 59.1%, only slightly above
chance level of 50% (when α = 12.). With data size 200, it chooses the second model only
for 15.7%, clearly indicating it is subject to over-ﬁtting.
Note that in our setting, GMM-AIC and GMM-BIC exhibit exactly same choice of
models as simple GMM based selection. This is due to the unbalance of two terms in the
criterion. In our case, the ﬁrst term is typically on order of more than 105 , while the second
term is no greater than 102 . Many factors inﬂuence the magnitude of the ﬁrst term, such as
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the choice of weighting matrix or number of moment conditions. Our result suggests that
while cross validation robustly performs in many situations, performance of GMM based
model selection is sensitive to those settings.
We turn to the case where the two models have the same number of parameters, while
the second model is misspeciﬁed. As the number of parameters is the same across two
models, note that GMM, GMM-BIC, and GMM-AIC simply choose the model with smaller
GMM minimand. Figure 1.2 compares the performance of cross-validation algorithm and
the GMM minimand based model selection when the second model is globally misspeciﬁed. The y-axis shows the probability that the correctly speciﬁed model is chosen by each
algorithm. The result indicates that when overﬁtting is not a concern, GMM based model
selection performs slightly better than cross validation, especially when the data is smaller.

1.4

Nonlinear Experiment: Collusion Detection
In this section, we demonstrate another Monte-Carlo study to show how our algo-

rithm works in a structural estimation incorporating nonlinear and non-nested models.
Speciﬁcally, we simulate and estimate a variant of a price collusion model suggested by
Bresnahan (1987). The goal of our model selection procedure is to detect whether the
ﬁrms are colluded, or determining the price competitively using the share and price data.
The underlying idea is that the prices of the products of colluded ﬁrms are determined
to maximize the joint proﬁt, while the competitive price should maximizes the proﬁt of
individual ﬁrms. Therefore, given the same (true) parameters in demand and cost function,
the pricing pattern varies according to the collusive structure.
A methodology to study whether collusive behavior exists within a certain industry is
by itself an important research topic because ignoring the possibility of collusive pricing
may lead to a biased inference of cost estimation, which could be a critical problem for
policy implication in applications such as merger analysis.
In the same way as the previous section, we compare the performance of CV-based
algorithm to GMM-minimand-based algorithm based on the theory of (Rivers and Vuong,
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2002). Note that since the number of parameters in a model does not vary across collusive
structure, AIC or BIC adjustment does not inﬂuence the model selection criteria. We show
that in a realistic sample size, CV performs better than in-sample comparison in many
cases.
The shares and prices are simulated from a standard logit demand system and static
pricing. We simulate data assuming a certain collusive structure. Then we test if and how
often CV algorithm can discover the assumed collusive structure. The estimation process
is similar to (Hu et al., 2014).

1.4.1 Model
Assume each ﬁrm produces a single product and denote them as j = 1, ..., J. The
markets are denoted as t = 1, ..., T . The demand is assumed to be a simple logit demand
speciﬁcation: the utility of a consumer i purchasing a product j in a market t is expressed
as
uijt = Xjt β + αpjt +

jt

+

ijt ,

where Xjt is the observed characteristics that inﬂuence the demand and
served utility shock . Assuming

ijt

jt

is the unob-

follows i.i.d type-I extreme value distribution, the

share function is
Djt (pt ) =

exp(Xj β + αpjt +
J
j =1

jt )

exp(Xj t β + αpj t +

j t)

Mt ,

where pt = {pjt }j=1,...,J is the vectorized prices and Mt is the market size which is known
to the researcher. For simplicity, we do not allow random-coefﬁcients ((Berry et al., 1995))
as typically done in applications.
Firms’ marginal cost is expressed as
M Cjt = Yjt γ + λjt
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,where Yjt is the observed characteristics that affect the marginal cost, and λjt is the i.i.d
cost shocks. The proﬁt of each product is
πjt (pt ) = (pjt − M Cjt )Djt (pt ).
We assume that colluded ﬁrms jointly maximize their net proﬁt, sum of πjt over j in
a group. Deﬁne Δ as a J × J matrix of price elasticity of colluded products where the
(j, r)th element is
⎧
⎪
Δjr =

r
− ∂D
∂pj

if j and r are colluded

⎪
⎩0

otherwise.

By solving the ﬁrst order conditions, the equilibrium prices are determined to satisfy
pt = (Δ)−1 Dt − MCt ,
where Dt and MCt are a vectorized representation of Djt (Pt ) and {M Cjt }j=1,..,J respectively.

1.4.2 Estimation and Model Selection
The parameter estimation under each model follows a standard GMM procedure with
instrumental variables. Let Z be instrumental variables that inﬂuence the price but are not
correlated with the unobserved shocks

and λ. Given a model, the parameters are chosen

to minimize the GMM objective deﬁned from the moment condition
E[ Z] = 0
E[λZ] = 0.
The instrumental variables Z include (i) own characteristics, (ii) square of own characteristics, (iii) mean of characteristics in a market, and (iv) square of mean characteristics in
a market. The weighting matrix is set to be W = (Z Z)−1 .
The candidate models are represented as partitions of ﬁrms into price-colluded groups.
For instance, if the number of ﬁrms is two (j = 1, 2), the possible models are either
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competitive ({{1}, {2}}) or collusive ({{1, 2}}). If three ﬁrms (j=1,2,3), possible models are {{1}, {2}, {3}} (all competitive), {{1}, {2, 3}}, {{1, 2}, {3}}, {{1, 3}, {2}}, and
{{1, 2, 3}} (all colluded).

1.4.3 Simulation Results
We consider different number of observed markets, T = {25, 50, 75, 100}, realistic
numbers for real world application3 . We also vary the true value of price coefﬁcient to
test the performance with different difﬁculty of model selection. Along with the data size,
the difﬁculty of model selection depends on how different the observed data would be
across different models. In this particular example, the key difference between models is
generated from cross price elasticity. When the cross price elasticity is low, competitive
price and colluded price do not differ as much, which makes it harder to ﬁnd the true
model. In logit-demand, the cross price elasticity is calculated by multiplying the share of
the two products. Thus, lower price coefﬁcient generally makes model selection easer as it
increases the realized share, and the cross price elasticity as a result. For each setting, we
generate 100 synthetic dataset and perform the model selection in each.
Table 1.1 reports the mean and standard deviation of CV score across true models and
candidate models with the price coefﬁcient equals to −.1 and −.3. The second column
represents the true partition of ﬁrms, and the third to seventh are the results corresponding
to each candidate model. The CV score of the true model is on average smaller than the
mis-speciﬁed models in any speciﬁcation. Also, the standard deviation of the score is
smaller for the true model. Both mean and standard deviation of the true model decline in
the number of observations.
We report the probability that each candidate model is chosen by our algorithm in table
1.2. In each setting, the probability to ﬁnd the true model increases in the number of
markets, which corresponds to our theoretical ﬁnding in section 2. For comparison, Table
1.3 presents the same for GMM-minimiand comparison.
3

For instance, (Nevo, 2001) observes 94 independent markets.
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Figure 1.3 compares the performance of our model selection to a simple in-sample
GMM ﬁt comparison under different price coefﬁcient. It shows that our CV algorithm
generally performs better than in-sample comparison. The difference is particularly large
when the true model is partially colluded (second column). As seen in Table 1.3, GMM
comparison tends to select all-competitive model in such a case.

1.5

Cross-Validation Approach to MPEC Estimation
In this section, we propose a method to apply cross-validation algorithm when estima-

tion is based on Mathematical Programming of Equilibrium Constraint (MPEC) approach
proposed by (Su and Judd, 2012). MPEC approach formulates the estimation as an optimization problem with constraints: The variables of the optimization consists of structural
parameters as well as endogenous latent economic variables, and the constraints among the
variables represent the equilibrium condition that the economic model requires.
The application of the cross validation procedure to MPEC estimation is not straightforward: If parameters estimated from training data is substituted in a MPEC model with test
data directly, the constraints would be not satisﬁed in general. In such a case, we cannot
directly compare GMM objective on test data across models since we also have to consider
the violation of constraints as indication of model misﬁt.
Taking the above discussion into consideration, we propose a modiﬁed cross validation
procedure. We differentiate the choice variables for the optimization problem into two
categories: model variables and observation-speciﬁc variables. Model variables are speciﬁc
to the model, therefore shared across training and test data. Observation-speciﬁc variables
are latent variables deﬁned on each observation. For instance, in BLP demand estimation
example on (Dubé et al., 2012), the price elasticity is a parameter assumed to be constant
across observations, thus treated as a model variable. Meanwhile, the unobserved utility
shock (
speciﬁc.

jt

in their notation) is deﬁned for each datapoint, thus regarded as observation
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Our modiﬁcation is simple. In training data, we jointly choose the model variables and
observation-speciﬁc variables to optimize the GMM objective function with equilibrium
constraints. In test data, we still solve a constrained optimization problem, but only with
respect to observation-speciﬁc variables while the model variables are set to the estimates
from training data. The algorithm is described in detail below and summarized in Algorithm 2.

1.5.1 GMM-MPEC
We ﬁrst outline the MPEC formulation of parameter estimation. Here we follow the
notation of (Su and Judd, 2012) except that we allow some endogenous variables to be
observation-speciﬁc. Suppose an econometric model Mi is expressed with the parameter vector θ(i) , a vector of endogenous variables σ (i) , and endogenous variables that are
observation-speciﬁc η (i) , and the equilibrium constraint h(i) (θ(i) , σ (i) , η (i) ) = 0. In MPEC
formulation, each model is characterized by a set of moment conditions with equilibrium
constraints:
(i)

(i)

(i)

Mi ⇒E[f (i) (vt , θ0 , σ0 , η0 )] = 0
s.t.
(i)

(i)

(i)

h(i) (θ0 , σ0 , η0 ) = 0.
Given the observation {vt }t=1,..,T , the parameters of each model are estimated via
MPEC:
(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(θT , σT , ηT ) = arg min QT (θ(i) , σ (i) , η (i) )

(1.13)

θ (i) ,σ (i) ,η (i)

s.t.

(1.14)

h(i) (θ(i) , σ (i) , η (i) ) = 0.

(1.15)
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where
(i)

QT (θ(i) , σ (i) , η (i) )
=

1
T

T
(i)

f (i) (vt , θ(i) , σ (i) , η (i) )

WT

t=1

(i),GMM−MPEC

Let θT

1
T

T

f (i) (vt , θ(i) , σ (i) , η (i) ) .
t=1
(i),GMM

be the parameters that are solution of Eq. (1.15), and let θT

be the solution of standard GMM (i.e., Eq. (1.1)). Moreover, let
(i),GMM−MPEC

VT

(i),GMM

and VT

(i)

(θ) = min QT (θ, σ (i) , η (i) )
σ (i) ,η (i)

s.t.

(1.17)

h(i) (θ, σ (i) , η (i) ) = 0,

(1.18)

(i)

(θ) = QT (θ). The equivalence of GMM and GMM-MPEC implies
(i),GMM−MPEC

θT

(i),GMM−MPEC

VT

1.5.2

(1.16)

(i),GMM

= θT

(i),GMM

(θ) = VT

(θ).

(1.19)

Cross-Validation in GMM-MPEC Approach

We split the observations in the same way as section 2. The moment on the datapoints
S is
(i)

QS (θ(i) , σ (i) , η (i) )
=

1
f (i) (vt , θ(i) , σ (i) , η (i) )
|NS | t∈N

(i)

WS

S

1
f (i) (vt , θ(i) , σ (i) , η (i) ) .
|NS | t∈N
S

We train the model to minimize the moment under equilibrium constraint. The trained
model is denoted as
(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(θS , σS , ηS ) = arg min QS (θ(i) )
θ (i) ,σ (i) ,η (i)

s.t.
h(i) (θ(i) , σ (i) , η (i) ) = 0.
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Once the model is trained, it is validated by the rest of datapoints. Instead of simply
evaluating the GMM objective in the validation data at the trained model parameters,
observation-speciﬁc endogenous variables need to be chosen so that the equilibrium constraints are satisﬁed. We do so by minimizing the GMM objective subject to equilibrium
constraints with respect to η only, while model parameters are ﬁxed at trained value.
Formally,
(i)

QS,valid =
⎧
arg min
η (i)

⎫
⎬

⎧

⎫
⎬

1
1
(i)
(i)
(i)
(i)
(i)
f (i) (vt , θS , σS , η (i) ) WS
f (i) (vt , θS , σS , η (i) )
⎩ |N\S |
⎭
⎩ |N\S |
⎭
t∈N
t∈N
\S

\S

s.t.
(i)

(i)

h(i) (θS , σS , η (i) ) = 0.
The averaged validation score of each model
(i)

Qvalid =

1
r Ck

(i)

QS,valid
S⊂{1,2,...,r}:|S|=r−k

is compared and the model of smaller averaged validation score is selected.
Remark 1.5.1 (consistency of GMM-MPEC) From (1.19) and Theorem 1.2.1, the consistency of GMM-MPEC with the same assumption on the moment directly follows.

1.6

Application: Dynamic Demand and Dynamic Pricing Model on Online Retailer
Data
In this section, we perform our model selection procedure in a structural model with

a real-world dataset. The models we compare are dynamic and static demand and pricing
model that are taken from (Conlon, 2012). In particular, we ﬁrst apply our cross-validation
algorithm to test either the state-of-the-art dynamic demand model ((Gowrisankaran and
Rysman, 2012)) or the traditional static demand model ((Berry et al., 1995)) has stronger
explanatory power in the consumer behavior. To this aim, we use monthly sales and price

27
data of an online-retail shop. Furthermore, we consider supply side dynamics of pricing
that takes the seasonality and consumer skimming into consideration such as (Nair, 2007):
We investigate whether or not such a model explains the observed pricing pattern better than
traditional static proﬁt maximization model that is based on the consumer model selected
in the previous step.
Structural estimation of a dynamic model has been an important frontier in industrial
organization, both on demand side and supply side. On demand side, dynamic model of
consumer behavior has been widely applied by researchers recently ((Gowrisankaran and
Rysman, 2012)). The underlying idea in the dynamic demand model is that consumers are
forward-looking regarding the changes in the market such as price and make a dynamic
decision by considering the future market state. Such a model is justiﬁed by the fact that
important parameters such as price elasticity could be severely mis-estimated by ignoring
the forward-looking behavior of consumers. Meanwhile, similar mis-estimation would
occur if a researcher applies a dynamic model in the case the consumers are in fact myopic.
From a market level data, it is not directly visible if consumers are forward-looking or
myopic.
Contrary to the demand side, dynamic pricing in supply side has a long history of
theoretical studies dating back to (Coase, 1972). Nevertheless, little empirical attention is
paid until recent years ((Nair, 2007)). Under certain conditions, ﬁrms have the incentive
to determine current price by taking its effect on the future proﬁt into consideration. For
example, when consumers are heterogeneous in an evaluation of a product, ﬁrms are motivated to ”skim” high-evaluation consumers in earlier periods by setting a high price and
later lower it. With myopic consumers (as in (Luo, 2015)), the pricing decision boils down
to a dynamic programming of a ﬁrm in the case of monopoly or a dynamic game between
ﬁrms in the case of oligopoly. If the consumers are also forward-looking, the pricing boils
down to a dynamic game between consumers and ﬁrms as studied in (Nair, 2007). In this
case, the observed price and demand are interpreted as a result of dynamic equilibrium.
It is not straightforward to infer if the pricing is dynamic or not from the market
level data. A declining tendency on the price does not always indicate that ﬁrms are
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making pricing decision dynamically: If the consumers are heterogeneous in either product
evaluation or price sensitivity and leave market after purchase, a myopic optimal price may
be decreasing in periods since the remaining consumers are more price elastic.
Applying dynamic pricing model to data generated from myopic pricing would cause
a signiﬁcant bias in the estimates of supply-side parameters such as marginal cost. For
instance, a dynamic pricing model may interpret an observed high price in a certain period
as a ﬁrm sparing some demand for the future, while it is a result of high marginal cost in
truth. Therefore, estimation of supply-side model parameters such as marginal cost requires
researchers to know if ﬁrms are myopic or forward-looking.
As it is important to correctly specify the dynamic feature of the agent’s decision
making both on demand and supply side, researchers are encouraged to verify whether
the decision making is static or dynamic from the data rather than appealing to intuition,
desirably based on real-world datasets. Regarding this aspect, we demonstrate our crossvalidation algorithm to compare two by two alternative models; dynamic or myopic consumers, and dynamic or myopic ﬁrms. The models are estimated via GMM-MPEC. We
take a simple dynamic model from (Conlon, 2012).
We perform estimation and model selection on a dataset of price and sales of an onlineretailer based in UK. The data is taken from the University of California Irvine (UCI)
Machine Learning Repository (henceforth, UCI). UCI repository consists of more than 300
datasets. The data used in this study is available here at https://archive.ics.uci.
edu/ml/datasets/Online+Retail free of charge. We consider the use of such a
publicly available dataset increases a reproducibility of a research process. In machine
learning ﬁeld, researchers are encouraged to compare the performance of a newly proposed
model or algorithm to old ones with a publicly available dataset, and the UCI repository is
widely used in this aim.
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1.6.1 Models
We consider models of 2 by 2 design: static or dynamic demand, static or dynamic
pricing. We denote each model as m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, where m = 1, 2 assume static
demand, m = 3, 4 assume dynamic demand, m = 1, 3 assume static pricing, and m =
2, 4 assume dynamic pricing. For simplicity, we assume that the ﬁrm and consumers
make their purchase decision independently across products. It is entirely possible to
test if this assumption is valid or not using our CV algorithm, but we omit it as the main
purpose of this section is an illustration of model selection procedure. The consumers are
heterogeneous in price sensitivity and the constant term of utility as in random coefﬁcients
model. We assume that consumers make a purchase at most once for each product within
the considered period. This assumption is justiﬁed by the transaction level data. Among
all the transactions used in the data, 75.8% of them are made by consumers who purchased
the same product only once in the considered period. An alternative approach is to model
repeated purchase and inventory behavior explicitly as in (Hendel and Nevo, 2006), but we
do not take this path for tractability.

Demand Model
In each period, consumers in the market decide whether to purchase a product or
not to maximize their objective function. If the demand is assumed to be static, the
objective function is simply the utility function deﬁned below. If the demand is dynamic,
the objective function is the inﬁnite-period sum of discounted utility.
Denote products as j = 1, ..., J and period as t = 1, ..., T . Consumer i’s utility of
purchasing a product j at period t is
0
uijt = αip pjt + αij
+ Xjt αx +

≡ δijt +

jt

+

ijt .

ijt

where pjt is the price of a product j in period t, Xjt is the observable characteristics, and
jt

is the i.i.d preference shock, which enters the moment conditions.

ijt

is the logit error
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term that follows type-I extreme value distribution and i.i.d across periods and products.
The utility of not purchasing is ui0t =

i0t

as the non-random component is normalized to

be zero. The random coefﬁcients follow a normal distribution.
αip = αp + νip ρp
αi0 = α0 + νi0 ρ0
,where (αp , α0 ) are the population mean of the utility coefﬁcients, νip and νi0 are draws from
a standard normal distribution, and (ρp , ρ0 ) are the standard deviation of the distribution of
the random coefﬁcients.
In the static demand model, the consumers simply compare the utility of purchase to
non-purchase in each period. Thus the purchase probability is
sm
ijt =

exp(δijt )
exp(δijt ) + 1
for m = 1, 2.

In the dynamic demand model, the consumers make purchase decision by comparing
the instant utility to the value of waiting until next period. Let Ωdijt be a state space for
a consumer i on product j at period t and Wij (Ωcijt ) be a value function associated to the
state. The Bellman equation is expressed as
d
d
d
) = max{uijt , ui0t + βE[Wij (Ωijt+1
)|Ωijt
]}.
Wij (Ωijt

The purchase probability of product j of a consumer i at period t is
d
sm
ijt (Ωijt ) =

exp(δijt )
exp(δijt ) + exp(βE[W (Ωcijt+1 )|Ωcijt ])
for m = 3, 4.

Following (Conlon, 2012), we make an assumption that consumers have perfect foresight over a transition of state Ωdijt . Formally,
d
] = wijt+1 ,
E[W (Ωdijt+1 )|Ωijt
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where
wit = ln(exp(δijt ) + exp(βwit+1 ))
for all i, j, and t. The second line is a direct consequence of the ﬁrst line following the
argument of (Rust, 1987). An alternative and more popular speciﬁcation is to assume that
consumers form an expectation of the future state by certain functional form, typically
an AR(1) regression. Compared to functional assumption perfect foresight reduces the
computational burden signiﬁcantly as it avoids integration over a distribution for calculating expectation (See (Conlon, 2012) for further discussion.) Also, note that by our CV
algorithm we can even investigate which of perfect foresight and AR(1) assumption makes
the model more accurate, which we believe is an interesting future work.
Finally, for both static and dynamic model let Mijt be the market size of consumers for
a product j at period t. Given the consumers purchase the same product at most once, the
market size transition for any model m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} follows
(m)

(m)

Mijt+1 = Mijt (1 − sijt ).

Supply Model
We express the marginal cost of product j at period t for the retailer as M Cjt where
M Cjt = Yjt

jt

+ λjt .

cost
is the observable characteristics of the product, and λjt is the cost shock i.i.d across
Xjt

time and products.
Denote the states of a product j for the retailer at period t as Ωsjt . Ωst includes the
market size of each consumer segment {Mijt }i and the draw of unobserved utility shock,
{

ijt }i

and λjt . Given the demand system described above, the demand function is written

as
R
(m)
Djt (pjt , Ωst )

(m) (m)

=

Mijt sijt .
r=1
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The instant proﬁt function of a product j at period t is therefore
πjt (pjt , Ωsjt ) = Djt (pjt , Ωsjt )(pjt − M Cjt ),
In static pricing model, m = 1, 3, the retailer simply chooses the price to maximize the
myopic proﬁt:
pm
jt = arg max πjt (pjt )∀j, t
pjt

for m = 1, 3.
In dynamic pricing model (m = 2, 4), the retailer maximizes the net proﬁt over time
with discounting. The discounting factor β is assumed to be same with consumers. The
retailer determines the price after observing the realization of the shocks, {

ijt }i

and λjt .

The value function of a product j is expressed as
Vj (Ωst ) = E max πjt + βVj (Ωst+1 ) Ωft , pjt ,
pjt

where the expectation is over the unobserved cost shock in the next period, λjt+1 . The
optimal price is determined as
s
s
pm
jt = arg max πjt (pjt ) + βE[Vj (Ωt+1 )|Ωt ]
pjt

for m = 2, 4.
Similar to the demand side, we assume that the retailer has a perfect information on the
transition of the error draw.

Equilibrium
This section describe the equilibrium condition for each model. When consumers and
ﬁrms are both static (m = 1), the equilibrium price and demand are the standard one
as in many models such as (Berry et al., 1995). When consumers are static but ﬁrms are
dynamic (m = 2), pricing can be seen as a single agent dynamic optimization problem with
continuous choice variable pjt . Similarly, when consumers are dynamic but ﬁrms are static
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(m = 3), consumers solve a single agent dynamic optimization problem. The consumers
problem is an optimal stopping problem as the choice is the timing of purchase. When
both consumers and the retailer are both dynamic (m = 4), we assume their behavior is at
Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) where consumers’ and retailer’s prediction of
the value function matches to the realization.

1.6.2 Data
We obtain our data from UCI machine Learning Repository. The UCI Machine Learning Repository maintains more than three hundreds datasets that are intensely used by
machine learning community for empirical investigation and comparison of algorithms.
When researchers propose a new model or algorithm in machine learning ﬁeld, a common
practice is to test its performance on the dataset in this repository. Such a culture gives a
thorough idea on the practical performance of existing models and algorithms. Moreover,
it helps a new researcher replicate the results on the existing papers.
The dataset we utilize in this study is the online retail data created by (Chen et al., 2012),
posted on UCI Machine Learning Repository in November 2015. The data is publicly available at https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Online+Retail. The
information about the data source is provided by the authors as follows: ”The online
retailer under consideration is a UK-based and registered non-store business with some
80 members of staff. The company was established in 1981 mainly selling unique alloccasion gifts. For years in the past, the merchant relied heavily on direct mailing catalogs,
and orders taken over phone calls. It was only 2 years ago that the company launched its
own web site and shifted completely to the web. Since then the company has maintained a
steady and healthy number of customers. The company also uses Amazon.co.uk to market
and sell its products.”
The data include all the transactions occurred on this retailer from December 2010 to
December 2011. Each transaction information includes quantity, unit price, consumer ID,
and country. We dropped any sales to outside UK. The majority of the sales is inside UK
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and non-UK sales has only limited amount (approximately 20%.) Since our purpose is to
demonstrate application of CV model selection to static and dynamic models, we aggregate
the data into a monthly sales of each product so that the data format follows typical market
level data and we can apply commonly used economic models. The monthly sales is simply
a sum of the quantity sold in a particular month. The monthly price is calculated as the
average of the price of transaction occurred in each month weighted by the quantity. We
omitted the products that have any zero sales in the considered months from the data.
On the top of price and sales data, the author hand-coded product category and subcategory based on the description of products. The categories include Children, Decoration,
or Kitchen. The number of products as well as basic statistics are summarized in table 1.4.
Figure 1.4 shows the average of monthly price and quantity sold in each category. It shows
that the dynamics is heterogeneous across categories. For instance, the price of products
in Gift and Decoration show tendency to decline over periods, while Home and Garden or
Candle show more ﬂuctuation.

1.6.3 Estimation and Model Selection
We implement model selection for the demand side and supply side sequentially. First
we test if the demand is static or dynamic. Subsequently, we test if the pricing is static
or dynamic, assuming the demand model chosen in the previous step. The endogenous
variables such as the market size Mijt and the share sijt are estimated in the demand side,
and imported over to the supply side estimation. Importantly, we do not have to specify the
pricing model on estimation of demand side by virtue of perfect foresight assumption. We
treat the data in each category independently.
We adapt 3-fold cross validation, (k, r) = (1, 3). Because the data has a panel structure
of products and periods, either the product-wise or period-wise split is possible. We adopt
split based on products. That is, we split the products into three groups, and use two of
them to estimate a model and use the last one for validation.
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MPEC formulation
To estimate each model by GMM-MPEC, we formulate the estimation as a minimization problem of GMM objective with equilibrium constraints based on the model described
above. Under the assumptions we impose, the equilibrium constraints are convex and
mostly either linear or quadratic. This fact ensures that we are able to ﬁnd an optimal
solution of the estimation problem.
First we describe the MPEC formulation of demand models. For the static demand
model (m = 1, 2), the set of constraints are
sm
ijt =

exp(δijt )
exp(δijt ) + 1

m
=
Djt

m m
Mijt
sijt
i

δijt =

αip pjt

0
+ αij
+ Xjt αx +

jt

(1.20)

αip = αp + νip ρp
αi0 = α0 + νi0 ρ0
m
m
Mijt
= Mijt−1
(1 − sm
ijt ),

for all (i, j, t).
For dynamic demand model, the constraints are similar except the consumers compare
the purchase utility to the value of waiting until next period.
sm
ijt =

exp(δijt )
exp(δijt ) + exp(βwit+1 )

wit = ln(exp(δit ) + exp(βwit+1 ))
Djt =

m m
sijt
Mijt
i

0
δijt = αip pjt + αij
+ Xjt αx +

αip = αp + νip ρp
αi0 = α0 + νi0 ρ0
m
m
m
Mijt
= Mijt−1
(1 − sijt
)

for all (i, j, t).

(1.21)
jt
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The model parameters to estimate are θd = (αp , α0 , ρp , ρ0 ). The data to input are
the realized demand Djt , the observed price pjt , and the random draws νip and νi0 . The
predicted share sijt , the market size of each consumer type Mijt , and the error draw

jt

are

the endogenous variables. In the dynamic demand model, the value function wijt is also
observation-speciﬁc endogenous variable to choose for the optimization.
We deﬁne the supply side estimation problem by the ﬁrst order condition and the
m
Bellman equation. By abusing notation, let Djt
(p) as a demand function with respect

to price in model m. The supply side equilibrium constraints of static pricing model is that
the observed prices are chosen to maximize the instant proﬁt:
m
Djt
=

m
Mijt
sijt
i

m
s
= Xjt
γ + λjt
M Cjt

(1.22)

m
m
pjt = arg max[Djt
(p)(p − M Cjt
)]
p

for all (i, j, t).
Instead of the third line above, the dynamic pricing model includes Bellman equation:
m
Djt
=

m
Mijt
sijt
i

s
M Cjt = Xjt
γ + λjt
m
pjt = arg max[Djt
(p)(p − M Cjt ) + βVjt+1 (Ωsjt+1 )]

(1.23)

p

m
Vjt (Ωsjt ) = max[Djt
(p)(p − M Cjt ) + βVjt+1 (Ωsjt+1 )].
p

The model parameters to estimate is θs = γ. M Cjt , λjt , and the value function are
observation-speciﬁc endogenous variables. Mijt and sijt are estimated in the demand side
as endogenous variables.
In both static and dynamic model, the constraint includes the retailer’s optimization
problem. We convert it to the ﬁrst order condition when solving for the estimation. The
details are in the Appendix.
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The GMM objective is a function deﬁned by moment conditions
E[ Z] = 0
E[λZ] = 0,
where Z is the instrumental variables. It includes category and subcategory dummies,
period dummy, and the market size of consumer segments {Mit }i . The market size information is correlated with price because it relates to the price elasticity. Since we assume
that the unobserved shocks are not serially correlated, the market size at period t is not
correlated with the shocks in the same period. Further detail of the setting for estimation is
described in the Appendix.

1.6.4 Results
Table 1.5 presents the cross validation score of each model. The second from the last
column shows the demand model selected by CV. The last column exhibits the selected
pricing model. One can see that the selected model varies across categories. On demand
side, the data on Children Decoration, and Kitchen are explained better by the static model,
while the dynamic model is preferred on other categories. On supply side, static pricing
explained the data of Crafts, Decoration, and Personal Item better.
The result of model selection is difﬁcult to interpret. One could try to provide some
intuition: For instance, the products that ﬁts static demand model better may be the ones
that consumers cannot make a consumption plan. On products where the retailer engages in
static pricing, it may be due to certain circumstance that researchers do not observe, such as
a contract with wholesaler or limitation of inventory. However, prior to observing the result
of cross validation, it is hard to make an reliable and scientiﬁc argument and justiﬁcation
for any model to be realistic.
The difﬁculty of interpretation in turn suggests that it is impractical for researchers to
assume a certain model beforehand. Selecting a structural model based on intuition may
severely bias the inference. To see the problem, 1.6 shows the estimated price coefﬁcient
in each category in different speciﬁcation. While in some cases two models exhibit fairly

38
similar result, in some cases such as Candle or Party the result is largely different. Therefore, we recommend that researchers cross validate their models whenever possible, unless
they have a strong reason to believe in certain model.

1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a cross-validation approach to model selection when
models are estimated via GMM criterion. Cross-validation procedure can be readily implemented in any existing economic models without much extra work for researchers.
We have proved its asymptotic consistency, and Monte-Carlo experiments in both linear
and non-linear model conﬁrm that cross-validation outperforms in-sample comparison that
economists traditionally practice.
We also proposed a way to apply cross-validation when models are estimated through
MPEC. As its real-world application, we adapt our CV based model selection to test
dynamic demand model and dynamic pricing model in an online-retailer data. We ﬁnd a
quite diverse result across product categories. Unexpectedly, even on the same retailer it is
not consistent whether a dynamic model is preferred or not. As the implication of structural
estimation largely depends on the assumed model, this result suggests that economists
should cross-validate their structural models rather than appealing to for reliability of their
inference.
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Algorithm 1 (k, r)-Cross Validation on GMM
1:

Input: Models {Mi }, data {vt }t=1,...,T .

2:

for each model Mi do

3:

for each training data {vt }t∈NS do

4:

Estimate model parameters as
(i)

(i)

θS = arg min QS (θ(i) )
θ (i) ∈Θ(i)

5:

(i)

(i)

Calculate the score QS,valid (θS )

6:

end for

7:

Calculate the average score
(i)

Qvalid =

1
r Ck

(i)

(i)

QS,valid (θS )
S⊂{1,2,...,r}:|S|=r−k

8:

end for

9:

Find the best model that exhibits the smallest Qvalid .

(i)

40

(a) p1 = 3,p2 = 5,α = 3.

(b) p1 = 3,p2 = 5,α = 7.

(c) p1 = 3,p2 = 9, α = 3.

(d) p1 = 3,p2 = 9, α = 7.

Figure 1.1.: The accuracy of model selection when p1 < p2 .
Note: The y-axis is the probability that the correctly speciﬁed model (model 1) is chosen by
each procedure. The number of instruments is set to be c1 = c2 = 10. The cross-validation
is 2-folds, i.e. r = 2. The weighting matrix is set to be identity matrix.
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(a) p1 = p2 = 3,α = 7.

(b) p1 = p2 = 3,α = 12.

(c) p1 = p2 = 7, α = 7.

(d) p1 = p2 = 7, α = 12.

Figure 1.2.: The accuracy of model selection when p1 = p2 .
Note: The y-axis is the probability that the correctly speciﬁed model (model 1) is chosen by
each procedure. The number of instruments is set to be c1 = c2 = 10. The cross-validation
is 2-folds, i.e. r = 2. The weighting matrix is set to be identity matrix.
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Table 1.1.: The validation Score of CV. Average of 100 iterations (standard deviation in the
bracket).
= −.1
Candidate Model
Number of Market

True Model
{1, 2, 3}

25

{1, 2}{3}
{1}{2}{3}

{1, 2, 3}

50

{1, 2}{3}
{1}{2}{3}

{1, 2, 3}

75

{1, 2}{3}
{1}{2}{3}

{1, 2, 3}

100

{1, 2}{3}
{1}{2}{3}

{1}{2}{3}

{1, 2, 3}

{1, 2}{3}

{1}{2, 3}

{1, 3}{2}

1.175

23.732

28.822

28.799

30.709

(1.570)

(44.224)

(89.920)

(56.014)

(60.764)

41.026

1.022

27.687

22.208

8.799

(61.458)

(1.049)

(54.927)

(29.543)

(13.536)

25.441

10.115

8.536

8.659

0.912

(26.184)

(17.287)

(9.610)

(8.646)

(1.021)

0.233

6.892

6.505

5.708

6.686

(0.181)

(10.774)

(5.495)

(5.073)

(7.486)

9.890

0.314

5.328

6.143

2.466

(11.450)

(0.207)

(3.391)

(5.696)

(1.781)

10.050

2.552

3.764

2.808

0.274

(10.486)

(2.366)

(10.730)

(2.180)

(0.215)

0.144

3.436

3.470

3.272

3.580

(0.094)

(2.328)

(2.232)

(1.865)

(2.415)

5.736

0.170

3.284

3.315

1.367

(4.349)

(0.114)

(2.456)

(1.864)

(0.867)

6.651

1.710

1.800

2.046

0.190

(5.723)

(1.334)

(1.082)

(3.060)

(0.152)

0.084

2.314

2.475

2.371

2.374

(0.046)

(1.195)

(1.716)

(1.418)

(1.424)

4.050

0.124

2.289

2.384

0.951

(3.121)

(0.071)

(1.754)

(1.785)

(0.671)

4.463

1.314

1.266

1.357

0.124

(2.282)

(1.761)

(0.791)

(1.017)

(0.081)

1.139

2.531

2.355

1.906

1.704

(2.269)

(3.149)

(3.209)

(2.087)

(1.771)

= −.3
{1, 2, 3}

25

{1, 2}{3}
{1}{2}{3}

{1, 2, 3}

50

{1, 2}{3}
{1}{2}{3}

{1, 2, 3}

75

{1, 2}{3}
{1}{2}{3}

{1, 2, 3}

100

{1, 2}{3}
{1}{2}{3}

8.223

1.174

3.528

4.746

1.646

(13.529)

(1.405)

(3.663)

(8.142)

(2.184)

10.684

3.272

3.175

4.273

1.190

(16.949)

(4.735)

(3.757)

(9.404)

(1.373)

0.281

0.651

0.661

0.640

0.643

(0.256)

(0.439)

(0.442)

(0.416)

(0.461)

1.713

0.319

0.970

1.165

0.396

(1.448)

(0.229)

(0.742)

(0.947)

(0.278)

3.628

0.998

1.056

1.041

0.365

(15.427)

(1.742)

(2.198)

(1.949)

(0.607)

0.159

0.387

0.387

0.426

0.356

(0.110)

(0.233)

(0.257)

(0.431)

(0.214)

1.096

0.210

0.623

0.574

0.238

(0.684)

(0.164)

(0.370)

(0.384)

(0.150)

1.303

0.504

0.467

0.464

0.169

(1.023)

(0.336)

(0.288)

(0.322)

(0.117)

0.103

0.261

0.255

0.277

0.258

(0.060)

(0.134)

(0.135)

(0.165)

(0.124)

0.743

0.134

0.419

0.414

0.157

(0.393)

(0.079)

(0.244)

(0.246)

(0.094)

0.937

0.317

0.335

0.329

0.108

(0.464)

(0.170)

(0.243)

(0.253)

(0.068)
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Table 1.2.: The Model Selection Probability with CV.
= −.1
Candidate Model
Number of Market

25

50

75

100

True Model

{1, 2, 3}

{1, 2}{3}

{1, 3}{2}

{1}{2, 3}

{1}{2}{3}

true

{1, 2, 3}

0.99

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.00

0.99

{1, 2}{3}

0.00

0.95

0.00

0.00

0.05

0.95

{1}{2}{3}

0.00

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.99

0.99

{1, 2, 3}

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

{1, 2}{3}

0.00

0.99

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.99

{1}{2}{3}

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

1.00

{1, 2, 3}

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

{1, 2}{3}

0.00

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

{1}{2}{3}

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

1.00

{1, 2, 3}

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

{1, 2}{3}

0.00

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

{1}{2}{3}

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

1.00

0.19

0.62

= −.3

25

50

75

100

{1, 2, 3}

0.62

0.04

0.04

0.11

{1, 2}{3}

0.00

0.62

0.01

0.03

0.34

0.62

{1}{2}{3}

0.00

0.07

0.05

0.09

0.79

0.79

{1, 2, 3}

0.77

0.05

0.04

0.10

0.04

0.77

{1, 2}{3}

0.00

0.64

0.01

0.00

0.35

0.64

{1}{2}{3}

0.00

0.01

0.04

0.04

0.91

0.91

{1, 2, 3}

0.78

0.05

0.07

0.06

0.04

0.78

{1, 2}{3}

0.00

0.57

0.02

0.00

0.41

0.57

{1}{2}{3}

0.00

0.05

0.01

0.03

0.91

0.91

{1, 2, 3}

0.82

0.04

0.09

0.02

0.03

0.82

{1, 2}{3}

0.00

0.64

0.00

0.00

0.36

0.64

{1}{2}{3}

0.00

0.04

0.02

0.01

0.93

0.93
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Table 1.3.: The Model Selection Probability with GMM.
= −.1
Candidate Model
Number of Market

25

50

75

100

True Model

{1, 2, 3}

{1, 2}{3}

{1, 3}{2}

{1}{2, 3}

{1}{2}{3}

true

{1, 2, 3}

0.99

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.99

{1, 2}{3}

0.00

0.95

0.00

0.00

0.05

0.95

{1}{2}{3}

0.00

0.02

0.01

0.02

0.95

0.95

{1, 2, 3}

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

{1, 2}{3}

0.00

0.92

0.02

0.00

0.06

0.92

{1}{2}{3}

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.03

0.97

0.97

{1, 2, 3}

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

{1, 2}{3}

0.00

0.97

0.00

0.00

0.03

0.97

{1}{2}{3}

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

1.00

{1, 2, 3}

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

{1, 2}{3}

0.00

0.96

0.00

0.00

0.04

0.96

{1}{2}{3}

0.00

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.99

0.99

0.11

0.61

= −.3

25

50

75

100

{1, 2, 3}

0.61

0.10

0.09

0.09

{1, 2}{3}

0.00

0.66

0.00

0.02

0.32

0.66

{1}{2}{3}

0.00

0.06

0.05

0.05

0.84

0.84

{1, 2, 3}

0.69

0.10

0.13

0.07

0.01

0.69

{1, 2}{3}

0.01

0.54

0.01

0.03

0.41

0.54

{1}{2}{3}

0.00

0.02

0.04

0.05

0.89

0.89

{1, 2, 3}

0.77

0.09

0.07

0.06

0.01

0.77

{1, 2}{3}

0.00

0.44

0.00

0.00

0.56

0.44

{1}{2}{3}

0.00

0.03

0.00

0.06

0.91

0.91

{1, 2, 3}

0.77

0.05

0.11

0.06

0.01

0.77

{1, 2}{3}

0.00

0.39

0.01

0.01

0.59

0.39

{1}{2}{3}

0.00

0.01

0.00

0.02

0.97

0.97
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Figure 1.3.: The choice probability of true model on CV and GMM model selection.
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Algorithm 2 (k, r)-Cross Validation on GMM-MPEC
1:

Input: Models {Mi }, data {vt }t=1,...,T .

2:

for each model Mi do

3:

for each training data {vt }t∈NS do

4:

Estimate model parameters as
(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

(θS , σS , ηS ) = arg min QS (θ(i) , σ (i) , η (i) )
θ(i) ,σ (i) ,η (i)

s.t. h(θ(i) , σ (i) , η (i) ) = 0.

5:

Calculate the score as
(i)

(i)

(i)

(i)

QS,valid (θS ) = min Q\S (θS , σS , η (i) )
η (i)

(i)

(i)

s.t. h(θS , σS , η (i) ) = 0.
6:

end for

7:

Calculate the average score
(i)

Qvalid =

1
r Ck

(i)

(i)

QS,valid (θS )
S⊂{1,2,...,r}:|S|=r−k

8:

end for

9:

Find the best model that exhibits the smallest Qvalid .

(i)
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Table 1.4.: Summary of Online-Retail Data
Ave. Unit Price

Ave. Monthly Sales

(USD)

(Thousand)

77

1.944

0.232

Baby Bib, Doll, Stationery Set

175

4.122

0.148

Knitting, Patches, Flannel, Sketchbook

38

2.694

0.214

153

2.454

0.1954

65

0.7881

0.207

Lamp,Cushion,Bath Salt

199

4.342

0.196

Mug, Tea Set, Lunch box

247

3.352

0.189

Category

Example of Products

# Products

Candle

Candles, Candle Holder, Candle Plate

Children
Crafts
Decoration

Photo frame, Flower, Decorative Signs

Gift

Gift boxes, Tape, Message cards

Home and Garden
Kitchen
Party

Balloons,Napkins, Paper cup

75

2.432

0.197

Personal

Umbrella, Ring, Shopping bag

109

2.864

0.159

Figure 1.4.: The price and quantity dynamics of online retail data in each category.
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Table 1.5.: CV score in different categories
Demand

Pricing

Selected Model

Category

Static

Dynamic

Static

Dynamic

Candle

.00683

.00651

.015302

.011402

Dyn

Dyn

Children

.00913

17.9

.982

.376887

Stat

Dyn

Crafts

.00847

.00655

.003628

.004258

Dyn

Stat

Decoration

.00162

.00163

.000454

.000644

Stat

Stat

Gift

.00328

.00277

.000288

.000119

Dyn

Dyn

Home and Garden .00177

.00109

.053322 0.022654

Dyn

Dyn

Kitchen

.00152

.00158

.002165

.000763

Stat

Dyn

Party

.00795

.00310

.016513

.002486

Dyn

Dyn

Personal Item

.00305

.00193

.003356 0.003443

Dyn

Stat

Demand Pricing

Table 1.6.: Estimated price coefﬁcient in different categories
Category

Static model Dynamic model

Candle

-6.52515

-1.71062

Children

-0.01343

-0.01835

Crafts

-2.12241

-0.66246

Decoration

-1.26782

-0.83267

Gift

-3.28775

-3.42115

Home and Garden

-0.1841

-0.4384

Kitchen

-0.56447

-0.53658

Party

-5.37787

-1.18728

Personal Item

-0.78579

-0.83831
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2. TWO-STAGE ALGORITHM FOR DISCRIMINATION-FREE
MACHINE LEARNING
2.1 Introduction
Algorithmic decision making process based on machine learning now affects many aspects of our lives. Emails are spam-ﬁltered by classiﬁers, images are automatically tagged
and sorted, and news articles are clustered and ranked. These days, even decisions regarding individual people are being made algorithmically. For example, computer-generated
credit scores are popular in many countries, and job interviewees are sometimes evaluated
by assessment algorithms1 . However, a potential loss of transparency, accountability, and
fairness arises when decision making is conducted on the basis of past data. For example,
if a dataset indicates that speciﬁc groups based on sensitive variables (e.g., gender, race,
and religion) are of higher risk in receiving loans, direct application of machine learning
algorithm would highly likely result in loan applicants on those groups being rejected.
This could be viewed as an algorithmic version of statistical discrimination. Statistical discrimination has been an important problem for economists both theoretically and
empirically ((Coate and Loury, 1993);(Arrow, 1998);(Altonji and Pierret, 2001);(Fang and
Moro, 2011)). In the upcoming big data era, this problem could arise severer than ever.
When decision is made from many variables, the difﬁculty is that removing the sensitive
variable from the dataset is not a sufﬁcient solution. This problem is long known as
disparate impact, a notion that was born in the 1970s. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that the hiring decision at the center of the Griggs v. Duke Power Co. case 2 was illegal
because it disadvantaged an application of to a certain race, even though the decision was
not explicitly determined based on the basis of race. Duke Power Co. was subsequently
1
2

https://www.hirevue.com/
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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forced to stop using test scores and diplomas, which are highly correlated with race, in its
hiring decisions.
The issue of disparate impact is particularly critical when big data is available. Machine
learning algorithms utilize thousands of variables, each of which may be correlated with
the sensitive variable to some extent. As a result, information of the sensitive variable can
be easily recovered even if the variable itself is not included in the input of the machine.
Moreover, it is extremely difﬁcult for human to check the inﬂuence of variables on the
prediction. Unlike the case of Duke Power Co., it is impossible for a human judge to determine discriminative effect of each variable one by one. As a result, we may statistically
discriminate a certain group even without noticing it.
The potential economic impact of statistical discrimination can be extremely considering how rapidly algorithmic decision making is prevailing in economic situations. Given
the importance of the problem, it is desirable to invent a methodology to eliminate disparate
impact from algorithmic decision makings. To do so, it requires an algorithmic approach
since achieving it manually is impossible.
In this paper, we propose a new fair algorithm that prevents disparate impact inspired
by two-stage least square regression. Though some literature have studied disparate impact
in the context of fairness-aware machine learning, there are three major limitations on the
existing algorithms intended to alleviate disparate impact:3
• Most of the existing algorithms are built for classiﬁcation tasks and cannot deal with
regression tasks. While classiﬁcation is very important, there are tasks that require
continuous target variables, such as salaries quoted in a job offer and penalties of
criminals. Unfortunately, only a few algorithms such as (Calders et al., 2013; Berk
et al., 2017a) are able to handle regression.
• Existing algorithms cannot deal with numerical (continuous) sensitive variables. Although most sensitive variables, such as gender, race, and religions are binary or
categorical (polyvalent), some sensitive variables are naturally dealt with in terms
3

More detailed discussion of existing algorithms is in Appendix.
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of numerical values. For example, the Age Discrimination Act

4

in the U.S. pro-

hibits discrimination in hiring, promotion, and compensation on the basis of age for
workers age 40 or above; here, age is a sensitive variable that is naturally dealt with
numerically.
• Direct application of a fair algorithm could lead to reverse discrimination. To see this,
let us take the example of income prediction in the Adult dataset5 ((Zliobaite et al.,
2011)). In the Adult dataset , women on average have lower incomes than men.
However, women in the dataset work fewer hours than men per week on average.
A fairness-aware classiﬁer built on the top of this dataset, which equalizes the wage
prediction of women and men, leads to a reverse discrimination that makes the salaryper-hour of men smaller than that of women. Such discrimination can be avoided by
introducing explanatory variables and this allows us to make a difference on the basis
of the explanatory variables. In fact, as in the case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
promoting decisions that cause disparate impacts is not allowed because they are not
based on a reasonable measure of job performance, which implies (in some cases)
decisions can be fair if they are of reasonable explanatory variables. Unfortunately,
most of the existing studies cannot utilize explanatory variables.
Inspired by the econometrics literature, we propose a two-stage discrimination remover
(2SDR) algorithm (Section 2.3). The algorithm consists of two stages. The ﬁrst removes
disparate impact, and the second is for prediction. The ﬁrst stage can be considered to be a
data transformation that makes the linear classiﬁers of the second stage fair.
We showed that 2SDR is a fair algorithm that (i) performs quite well in not only
regression tasks but also classiﬁcation tasks and (ii) is able to utilize explanatory variables
to improve estimation accuracy. Moreover (iii), it reduces discrimination bias in numeric
sensitive variables, which enables us to avoid other classes of discrimination, such as age
discrimination (Center., 1975).
4
5

The United States Civil Rights Center (1975).
https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/machine-learning-databases/adult/
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Section 2.2 deﬁnes the problem of the prediction with potential discrimination. Section
2.3 introduces our 2SDR algorithm. Theoretical property of 2SDR is analyzed in Section
2.4. We veriﬁed the practical utility of 2SDR by using real-world datasets in Section 2.5.
Section 2.6 concludes the paper.

2.2

Problem
Each vector in this paper is a column vector and is identiﬁed as a d × 1 matrix where

d is the dimension of the vector. Let n be the number of datapoints. The i-th datapoint is
comprised of a tuple (si , xi , zi , yi ), where
• si ∈ Rds is the ”sensitive” variables of ds dimensions that requires special care (e.g.,
sex, race, and age).
• xi ∈ Rdx is the normal non-sensitive variables of dx dimensions. The difﬁculty in
fairness-aware machine learning is that xi is correlated with si and requires to be
”fairness adjusted”.
• zi ∈ Rdz is the set of explanatory variables of dz dimensions that either are not
independent of si , or not to be adjusted for other reasons. Note that zi can be blank
(i.e., dz = 0) when no explanatory variable is categorized in.
• yi is the target variable to predict. In the case of classiﬁcation, yi ∈ {0, 1}, whereas
in the case of regression, yi ∈ R.
Note that, unlike most existing algorithms, we allow si to be continuous.
Unlike economic research, the goal of machine learning is to provide a prediction.
We try to ﬁnd a function ŷ(s, x, z) that calculates an estimate of y from the observed data
s, x, z.
First, we estimate a function ŷ(s, x, z) using the training data. The objective is given a data
(s, x, z) out of the training data, the prediction ŷ(s, x, z)
ŷ(s, x, z) is also supposed to comply with some fairness criteria, which we discuss in the
next section.
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A fairness-aware algorithm outputs ŷ(s, x, z), which is an estimator of y that complies
with some fairness criteria, which we discuss in the next section. We also use Y ∈
Rn×1 , X ∈ Rn×dx , Z ∈ Rn×dz , S ∈ Rn×ds to denote a sequence of n datapoints. Namely,
the i-th rows of S, X, Z, and Y are si , xi , zi , and yi , respectively.

2.2.1

Fairness criteria

This section discusses fairness criteria that a fairness-aware algorithm is expected to
comply with. We consider group-level fairness in the sense of preventing disparate impact
((Commission., 1979)), which beneﬁts some group disproportionally. For ease of discussion, we assume ds = 1 and s is a binary6 or real single variable. Note that our method
(Section 2.3) is capable of dealing with (i) multiple sensitive variables, (ii) continuous
s. Let (s, x, z, y) be a sample from the target dataset to make a prediction. Let ŷ =
ŷ(s, x, z) be an estimate of y that an algorithm outputs. For binary s and ŷ, the P%-rule
((Commission., 1979; Zafar et al., 2017b)) is deﬁned as
min
p

P[ŷ = 1|s = 1] P[ŷ = 1|s = 0]
,
P[ŷ = 1|s = 0] P[y = 1|s = 1]

(
≥

p
.
100

(2.1)

The rule states that each group has a positive probability at least p% of the other group.
The 100%-rule implies perfect removal of disparate impact on group-level fairness, and a
large value of p is preferred.
For binary s and continuous ŷ, an natural measure that corresponds to the p%-rule is
the mean distance (MD) (Calders et al., 2013), which is deﬁned as:
|E[ŷ|s = 1] − E[ŷ|s = 0]| ,

(2.2)

which is a non-negative real value, and a MD value close to zero implies no correlation
between s and y. Moreover, Calders et al. (Calders et al., 2013) introduced the area under
the receiver operation characteristic curve (AUC) between ŷ and s:
i∈{1,2,...,n}:si =1

j∈{1,2,...,n}:sj =0

ns=1 × ns=0
6

I[ŷi > ŷj ]

,

(2.3)

Although there are several possible deﬁnitions, it is not very difﬁcult to extend a fairness measure of binary
s to one of a categorical s.
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where I[x] is 1 if x is true and 0 otherwise, and ns=1 (resp. ns=0 ) is the number of datapoints
with s = 1 (resp. s = 0), respectively. The AUC takes value in [0, 1] and is equal to 0.5 if
s shows no predictable effect on y.
Moreover, for continuous s, we use the correlation coefﬁcient (CC) |Covsŷ| between
s and ŷ as a fairness measure. Note that, when s is binary, the correlation is essentially
equivalent to MD (Eq. (2.2) up to a normalization factor.

2.3

Proposed Algorithm
Here, we start by reviewing the idea of the two-stage least squares (2SLS), a debiasing

method that is widely used in statistics, econometrics, and many branches of natural science
(Section 2.3.1). Inspired by 2SLS, we describe the two-stage discrimination remover
(2SDR) for fairness-aware classiﬁcation and regression (Section 2.3.2). Section 2.3.3
compares 2SDR with existing data preprocessing methods.

2.3.1

Two-stage least squares (2SLS)

Consider a linear regression model
yi = xi β + i ,
where the goal is to predict yi ∈ R from variables xi ∈ Rdx . If the noise

i

is uncorrelated

with xi , an ordinary least square β̂OLS = (X X)−1 X Y consistently estimates β. However, the consistent property is lost when xi is correlated with : Namely, it is well-known
((Wooldridge, 2013)) that, under mild assumption
p

β̂OLS → β +

Covx
,
σx2

where Covx is the covariance between x and . σx2 is the variance of xi , and the arrow
p

→ indicates a convergence in probability. To remove the bias term, one can utilize a set of
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additional variables zi that are (i) independent of i , and (ii) correlate with xi . The crux of
2SLS is to project the columns of X in the column space of Z:
X̂ = Z(Z Z)−1 Z X
β̂2SLS = (X̂ X̂)−1 X̂ Y.

(2.4)

Unlike the OLS estimator, the 2SLS estimator consistently estimates β. That is,
p

β̂2SLS → β.
Note that the exogenous control variables are included both in X and Z if they exist.

2.3.2

Proposed algorithm: 2SDR

The idea of our algorithm is inspired by 2SLS described above. Intuitively, in the
ﬁrst stage of 2SLS, the variation of X̂ represents the variation of X that is explained by
the instrumental variables Z. Meanwhile, the residual of the ﬁrst stage, X − X̂, should
capture all the variation of X that is orthogonal to Z. Now if we replace Z with sensitive
variables S, the residual still contains the information of X that is useful to predict y, but
the correlation with s is removed. Thus, if we use this residual instead of X̂ in the second
stage, the resulting prediction is not inﬂuenced by the correlation between S and X and
therefore free from disparate impact. Note that in the ﬁrst stage, one can add more control
variables to S as long as they are not correlated with S, or disparate impact due to them
are acceptable. One potential example of such a variable is high school GPA on college
admission: even if difference across gender or race exist, we may not need to adjust it if it
is self responsibility.
Formally, our case considers a prediction problem with a fairness constraint (Section
2.2). That is, to estimate the relationship
y i = xi β + i ,
subject to fairness criteria that urges an estimator ŷi to be uncorrelated to si (Section 2.2.1).
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Algorithm 3 2-Stage Discrimination Remover (2SDR).
1:

Input: Second stage algorithm f (x, z).

2:

Using training data (Strain , Xtrain , Ztrain , Ytrain ):

3:

ˆ s ← ([Strain , Ztrain ] [Strain , Ztrain ])−1 [Strain , Ztrain ] Xtrain .
B

4:

Utrain ← Xtrain − [Strain , Ztrain ]B̂s .

5:

Train the function f with (Utrain , Ztrain ).

6:

for each data point (si , xi , zi , yi ) in testdata do

7:

Predict ui ← xi − [si , zi ] B̂s .

8:

Predict ŷi ← f (ui , zi ).

9:

end for

The main challenge here is that xi is correlated with the sensitive variable si , and thus,
simple use of the OLS estimator yields a dependency between ŷi and si . To resolve this
issue, we use U = X − [S, Z]([S, Z] [S, Z])−1 [S, Z] X, which is the residual of X
regressed on S and Z and is free from the effect of S, for predicting Y. In the second
stage, we use U and Z to learn an estimator of Y by using an off-the-shelf regressor or
classiﬁer. The entire picture of the 2SDR algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 3.
One big advantage of our algorithm is that one may use any algorithm in the second
stage, though we mainly intend a linear classiﬁer or regressor for the reason discussed in
Section (Theorem 2.4). Following the literature of machine learning, we learn the ﬁrst and
the second stage with the training dataset, and use them in the testing data set.

2.3.3

Comparison with other data preprocessing methods

The ﬁrst stage of 2SDR (Line 3 of Algorithm 3) learns a linear relationship between
S and X. This stage transforms each datapoint by making the second stage estimator free
from the disparate impact, so one may view 2SDR as a preprocessing-based method that
changes the data representation. This section compares 2SDR with existing methods that
transform a dataset before classifying or regressing it. At a word, there are two classes of
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data transformation algorithm: An algorithm of the ﬁrst class utilizes the decision boundary
and intensively resamples datapoints close to the boundary (Kamiran and Calders, 2010).
Such an algorithm performs well in classifying datasets, but its extension to a regression
task is not straightforward. An algorithm of the second class successfully learns a generic
representation that can be used with any classiﬁer or regressor afterward (Zemel et al.,
2013; Feldman et al., 2015). Such an algorithm tends to lose information at the cost of
generality: the method proposed by Zemel et al. (Zemel et al., 2013) maps datapoints into
a ﬁnite prototypes, and the one in Feldman et al. (Feldman et al., 2015) conducts a quantilebased transformation, and loses the individual modal structures of the datapoints of s = 0
and s = 1. As a result, these methods tend to lose estimation accuracy. Moreover, its
extension to a numeric s is non-trivial. The ﬁrst stage in our method can be considered to
be a minimum transformation for making linear regression fair and preserves the original
data structure. Section 2.5 compares the empirical performance of 2SDR with those of
Zemel et al. and Feldman et al. (Zemel et al., 2013; Feldman et al., 2015).

2.4 Analysis
This section analyses 2SDR. We ﬁrst assume the linearity between S and X in the ﬁrst
stage, and derive the asymptotic independence of U and S (Theorem 2.4.1). Although such
assumptions essentially follow the literature of 2SLS and are reasonable, regarding our aim
of achieving fairness, a guarantee for any classes of distribution on x and s is desired:
Theorem 2.4.2 guarantees the fairness with a very mild assumption when the second stage
is a linear regressor.
Assumption 2.4.1 Assume the following data generation model where datapoints are i.i.d.
drawn:
yi = xi β +

i

(2.5)

and
xi = si Bs + ηi

(2.6)
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where

i

∈ R and ηi ∈ Rdx are mean-zero random variables independent of si . Moreover,

the covariance matrix of x is ﬁnite and full-rank 7 .
The following theorem states that under Assumption 2.4.1, u is asymptotically independent of s.
Theorem 2.4.1 (Asymptotic fairness of 2SDR under linear dependency) Let (si , xi , zi , yi )
be samples drawn from the same distribution as the training dataset, and ui is the corresponding residual learnt from the training distribution. Under Assumption 2.4.1, ui is
asymptotically independent of si . Moreover, if zi is independent of si , ŷi is asymptotically
independent of si .
Proof Under Assumption 2.4.1, it is well known (e.g., Thm 5.1 in ((Wooldridge, 2013)))
p

that the ﬁrst-stage estimator is consistent. That is, B̂s → Bs as n → ∞, from which
p

we immediately obtain ui → ηi . By the assumption that ηi is independent of si , ui is
asymptotically independent of si . The independence of ŷi and si follows from the fact that
ŷi is a function of ui and zi that are asymptotically independent of si .
From Theorem 2.4.1, we see that 2SDR combined with any classiﬁer or regressor in
the second-stage is fair (i.e., achieves a p%-rule for any p < 100 (resp. any MD > 0) in
classiﬁcation (resp. regression) with a sufﬁciently large dataset. Essentially, Theorem 2.4.1
states that if the relation between u and s is linear, the ﬁrst-stage OLS estimator is able to
learn the relationship between them, and as a result u is asymptotically equivalent to η,
which is the fraction of u that cannot be explained by s.
Heteroskedasticity in x: As long as Assumption 2.4.1 holds, x is asymptotically
independent of s. However, some of the assumptions may not hold for some variables in a
dataset. In particular, Eq. (2.6) implies that x is linear to s, and thus, the distribution of x
conditioned on s = 1 and s = 0 is identical after correcting the bias E[x|s = 1]−E[x|s = 0]
8
7

. Figure 2.1 shows some variables where the distribution of x is very different among s = 1

Note that this is a sufﬁcient condition for the “no perfect collinearity” condition in Wooldridge (Wooldridge,
2013).
8
For the ease of discussion, let s be binary value here.
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(a) Distribution of PctUnemployed in the (b) Distribution of age in the Adult dataset
C&C dataset

Figure 2.1.: The difference of distribution in characteristics in sensitive characteristics.
The ﬁrst histogram (Figure (a)) shows the percentage of people in the labor force
and unemployed (PctUnemployed) in each community in the C&C dataset, where the
horizontal axis is PctUnemployed and vertical axis is the number of corresponding
communities. The communities are categorized into the ones with a large portion of black
people (C1) and the others (C2). One can see that PctUnemployed in C2 is sharply centered
around 0.25, whereas the value in C1 shows a broader spectrum: As a result the variance of
PctUnemployed is greatly differ among the two categories. The second histogram (Figure
(b)) shows the number of people of different age in the Adult dataset, where the horizontal
axis is the age and the vertical axis is the number of people. One can see that not only
the variances but also the form of distributions are different between women and men, as
majority of the women in the dataset are of the youngest category. The details of these
datasets are provided in Section 2.5.

and s = 0. Taking these variables into consideration, we would like to seek some properties
that hold regardless of the linear assumption in the ﬁrst stage. The following theorem states
that 2SDR has a plausible property that makes ŷ fair under very mild assumptions.
Theorem 2.4.2 (Asymptotic fairness of 2SDR under general distributions) Assume that
each training and testing datapoint is i.i.d. drawn from the same distribution. Assume that
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the covariance matrix of x and s are ﬁnite and full-rank. Assume that the covariance matrix
between x and s is ﬁnite. Then, the covariance vector Covsu ∈ Rds ×dx converges to 0 in
probability as n → ∞, where 0 denotes a zero matrix.
Proof Let (s, x, z, y) be a sample from the identical distribution. The OLS estimator in
the ﬁrst stage is explicitly written as
B̂s = (Strain Strain )−1 Strain Xtrain ,
which, by the law of large numbers, converges in probability to Cov−1 (s, s)Covsx, where
Cov−1 (s, s) ∈ Rds ×ds is the inverse of the covariance matrix of s, and Covsx ∈ Rds ×dx is
the covariance matrix between s and x. Then,
ˆ s
Covsu = Covsx − CovsB
s
p

→ Covsx − CovssCov−1 (s, s)Covsx
= Covsx − Covsx = 0.

(2.7)

Asymptotic fairness of regressor: Notice that a linear regressor in the second stage
outputs ŷ as a linear combination of the elements of u and z. Theorem 2.4.2 implies that a
regressor is asymptotically fair in the sense of MD (for binary s) or correlation coefﬁcient
(for continuous s). Unfortunately, it does not necessarily guarantee a fair classiﬁcation
under heteroskedasticity: A linear classiﬁer divides datapoints into two classes by a linear
decision boundary (i.e. ŷ is whether a linear combination of u and z is positive or negative),
and no correlation between u, z and s does not necessarily implies no correlation property
between ŷ and s. Still, later in Section 2.5 we empirically verify the fairness property of
2SDR in both classiﬁcation and regression.
Generalization and ﬁnite-time analysis: The analysis in this section is very asymptotic and lacks a ﬁnite time bound. As OLS is a parametric model, the standard central limit
theorem can be applied to obtain the asymptotic properties of the 2SDR estimator: Like the
√
2SLS estimator, the 2SDR estimator is expected to converge at a rate of O(1/ n).
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(a) CC as a func. of

(b) CC as a func. of

(c) CC as a func. of

(d) CC as a func. of

n

dx

σηs

σs

(e) RMSE as a func.

(f) RMSE as a func.

(g) RMSE as a func.

(h) RMSE as a func.

of n

of dx

of σηs

of σs

Figure 2.2.: Performance of the algorithm with different parameters.
Correlation coefﬁcient (CC) with different parameters (Figures (a)-(d)). Figure (a) is the
result with different datasize, Figure (b) is the result with different dimension of x, Figure
(c) is the result with different strength of correlation between x and s, and Figure (d) is the
result with different variance of s. One can see that with sufﬁcient large n (n ≥ 1, 000),
2SDR has consistently removes correlation between s and ŷ. Figures (e)-(h) shows the
root mean square error (RMSE) with the same setting as Figures (a)-(d), where RMSE is
deﬁned as the squared empirical mean of (ŷ − y)2 . The larger dx , Covxs, or σs is, the gap
of RMSE between 2SDR and OLS is larger. This is because (i) the correlation between x
and s causes a disparate impact of OLS, (ii) whereas 2SDR, which keeps ŷ fair, forces a
large bias correction when the correlation is large. For each set of parameters the result is
averaged over 100 independent runs.
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2.5 Experiments
In the previous section, we provided results suggesting that 2SDR achieves fairness in
an asymptotic sense. To verify the actual performance of 2SDR, we conducted computer
simulations. We ﬁrst describe its results for a synthetic dataset (Section 2.5.1), and then
describes its results for ﬁve real-world datasets (Section 2.5.2). Our simulation was implemented in Python by using the scikit-learn library9 . Each of the simulations took from
several seconds to several minutes on a modern PC.

2.5.1 Synthetic dataset
This section compares 2SDR with the standard OLS estimator on synthetically-generated
datasets. Each data point (si , xi , zi , yi ) was generated from the following process, which is
the standard assumption in the two-stage regression problem (Section 2.3.1):
yi = xi βx + zi βz +

(2.8)

xi = si βs + ηi

(2.9)

zi ∼ N (0, σz )

(2.10)

∼ N (0, σ )
⎛ ⎛
(ηi , si ) ∼ N ⎝0, ⎝

⎞⎞
ση

σηs

σηs

σs

(2.11)

⎠⎠ .

Obviously, xi and si are correlated, and thus, a naive algorithm that tries to learn Eq. (2.8)
suffers a disparate impact, whereas 2SDR tries to untangle this dependency by learning the
relationship (2.9) in the ﬁrst stage. Unless speciﬁed, we set each parameters as follows:
dx = dz = 5 and ds = 1. σ = 3.0. ση , σz , and σs are diagonal matrices with each diagonal
entry is 1.0, and σηs is a matrix with each entry is 0.3. Each entry of βx and βz are 0.5, and
each entry of βs is 0.2. The number of datapoint n is set to 1, 000, and 2/3 (resp. 1/3) of
the datapoints are used as training (resp. testing) datasets, respectively. Figure 2.2 shows
the correlation coefﬁcient as as measure of fairness and root mean squared error (RMSE)
9

http://scikit-learn.org/
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as a measure of prediction power for various values of parameters. 2SDR is consistently
fair regardless of the strength of the correlation between x and s.

2.5.2 Real-world datasets
This section examines the performance of 2SDR in real-world datasets. The primary
goal of Section 2.5.2 and 2.5.2 are to compare the results of 2SDR with existing results. We
tried to reproduce the settings of existing papers (Calders et al., 2013; Feldman et al., 2015)
as much as possible. Section 2.5.2 provides the results with numerical s. In the Appendix,
we provide additional results for other datasets and other settings such as multiple sensitive
variables case and nonlinear machines.
We conducted a set of simulations with four datasets: Namely, The Adult dataset,
the Community and Crime (C&C) dataset, the Compas dataset, and the German dataset.
Unordered categorical attributes are expended into dummies. Adult, Compas, and German
are classiﬁcation datasets (i.e., y = {−1, +1}), whereas C&C is a regression dataset.
Unless explicitly described, we only put the intercept attribute (i.e., a constant 1 for all
datapoints) into z. We used OLS in each attribute of the ﬁrst stage, and OLS (resp. the
Ridge classiﬁer) in the regression (resp. classiﬁcation) of the second stage. Note that
the ridge classiﬁer is a linear model that imposes l2-regularization to avoid very large
coefﬁcients, which performs better when the number of samples is limited. For binary s,
(i) we removed the attributes of variance conditioned on s = 0 or s = 1 being zero because
such a attribute gives a classiﬁer information that is very close to s, and (ii) we conducted a
variance correction after the ﬁrst stage that makes the variance of U conditioned on s = 1
and s = 0 identical.
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Regression results for C&C dataset
We ﬁrst show the results of a regression on the Communities and Crime10 dataset that
combines socio-economic data and crime rate data on communities in the United States.
The Community and Crime (C&C) dataset involves 101 attributes and 1, 994 datapoints.
Following (Calders et al., 2013), we made a binary attribute s as to the percentage of
black population, which yielded 970 instances of s = 1 with a mean crime rate y = 0.35
and 1, 024 instances of s = 0 with a mean crime rate y = 0.13. Note that these ﬁgures are
consistent with the ones reported in Calders et al. (Calders et al., 2013). Table 2.1 shows
the results of the simulation. At a word, 2SDR removes discrimination while minimizing
the increase of the root mean square error (RMSE). One can see that in the sense of RMSE,
OLS and SEM-MP (Calders et al., 2013) perform the best, although these algorithms do not
comply with the two fairness criteria. On the other hand, 2SDR and SEM-S (Calders et al.,
2013) comply with the fairness criteria, and with 2SDR performing better in the sense of
regression among the two algorithms. Furthermore, we put two attributes (“percentage of
divorced females” and “percentage of immigrants in the last three years”) into explanatory
attributes z, whose results are shown as “2SDR with explanatory attrs” in Table 2.1. One
can see that the RMSE of 2SDR with these explanatory attributes is signiﬁcantly improved
and very close to OLS.

Classiﬁcation result with Adult and German datasets
This section shows the result of classiﬁcation with the Adult and German datasets.
The adult dataset is extracted from the 1994 census database, where the target binary
attribute indicates whether each person’s income exceeds 50,000 dollars or not. German is
a dataset that classiﬁes people into good or bad credit risks 11 . The Adult dataset involves
49 attributes and 45, 222 datapoints, whereas the German dataset involves 47 attributes and
1, 000 datapoints.
10
11

http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/communities+and+crime
https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Statlog+(German+Credit+Data)
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Table 2.1.: Regression Results.

Algorithm

MD

AUC

RMSE

OLS

0.22

0.85

0.14

2SDR

0.02

0.48

0.18

2SDR with explanatory attrs

0.12

0.69

0.15

SEM-S

0.01

0.50

0.20

SEM-MP

0.17

0.76

0.14

Note: The scores are averaged result over 10-fold cross validation ((Calders et al., 2013)).
The results of SEM-S and SEM-MP are the ones reported in Calders et al. (Calders et al.,
2013). “2SDR with explanatory attrs” shows the result of 2SDR with two explanatory
attributes (”FemalePctDiv”,”PctImmigRecent”]) added to z. A smaller MD indicates better
fairness, and an AUC close to 0.5 indicates a very fair regressor. Smaller RMSE indicates
better regression accuracy.

Following Zemel et al. and Feldman et al. (Zemel et al., 2013; Feldman et al., 2015),
we used sex (resp. age) in the Adult (resp. German) datasets. Age in the German dataset is
binarized into Young and Old at the age of 25 (Calders et al., 2013). Some sparse attributes
in Adult are summarized to reduce dimensionality (Zafar et al., 2017a).
Let us compare the results shown in Table 2.2 with the ones reported in previous
papers. In a nutshell, 2SDR, which complies with the 80%-rule, outperforms two data
preprocessing methods on the Adult dataset, and performs as well as them on the German
dataset: Zemel et al. (Zemel et al., 2013) reported that their data transformation combined
with a naive Bayes classiﬁer has ∼ 80% (resp. ∼ 70%) accuracy on the Adult (resp.
German) datasets. Moreover, Feldman et al. (Feldman et al., 2015) reported that their data
transformation combined with a Gaussian Naive Bayes classiﬁer had accuracy of 79 ∼ 80%
(resp. 70 ∼ 76%) on the Adult (resp. German) datasets. The method by Zemel et al.
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Table 2.2.: Classiﬁcation results for the Adult and German dataset.

Adult dataset
Algorithm P%-rule

German dataset

Accuracy

Algorithm P%-rule

Accuracy

OLS

0.30

0.84

OLS

0.47

0.73

2SDR

0.83

0.82

2SDR

0.81

0.73

Note: The column “Accuracy” presents the classiﬁcation accuracy. Unlike OLS, which
does not take fairness into consideration, 2SDR complies with the 80%-rule. In German
dataset, the result is averaged over 100 random splits over the training and testing datasets,
where two-thirds of the datapoints are assigned to the training dataset at each split.

(Zemel et al., 2013) coarse-grains the data by mapping them into a ﬁnite space, which we
think the reason why its performance is not as good as ours. Meanwhile, the quantilebased method by Feldman et al. (Feldman et al., 2015) performed impressively well in the
German dataset but not very well in the Adult dataset: In the Adult dataset, it needed to
discard most of the attributes that are binary or categorical, which we consider as the reason
for the results.

Numeric s
Next, we considered numeric sensitive attributes. Table 2.3 shows the accuracy and
correlation coefﬁcient in OLS and 2SDR. On the C&C dataset, 2SDR reduced correlation
coefﬁcient (CC) with a minimum deterioration to its RMSE. In other words, 2SDR was a
very efﬁcient at removing the correlation between ŷ and s.
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Table 2.3.: Results in the case s is median income (C&C) or age (Adult and German).

Algorithm (Dataset)

CC

Accuracy RMSE

OLS (C&C)

0.50

-

0.14

2SDR (C&C)

0.04

-

0.17

OLS (Adult)

0.22

0.84

-

2SDR (Adult)

0.07

0.83

-

OLS (German)

0.11

0.76

-

2SDR (German)

0.05

0.75

-

Note: Note that age was not binarized in the result of this table.

2.6 Conclusion
We studied indirect discrimination in classiﬁcation and regression tasks. In particular,
we studied a two-stage method to reduce disparate impact. Our method is conceptually
simple and has a wide range of potential applications. Unlike most of the existing methods,
our method is general enough to deal with both classiﬁcation and regression with various
settings. It lies midway between a fair data preprocessing and a fair estimator: It conducts
a minimum transformation so that linear algorithm in the second stage is fair. Extensive
evaluations showed that our method complied the 80%-rule the tested real-world datasets.
The following are possible directions of future research:
• Other criteria of fairness: While the disparate impact considered in this paper is
motivated by the laws in the United States, the notion of fairness is not limited
to disparate impact (Berk et al., 2017b). To name a few studies, the equalized
odds condition (Hardt et al., 2016) and disparate mistreatment (Zafar et al., 2017a)
have been considered. Extending our method to other criteria of fairness would be
interesting.
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• Non-Linear second stage: In this study, we restricted the second-stage algorithm to
be linear. The main reason for doing so is that the ﬁrst stage in 2SDR is designed to
remove the correlation between ŷ and s, which is very suitable to linear algorithms
(Theorem 2.4.1 and 2.4.2). We have also conducted some experiment with generalized linear model in the second stage (Section E), where we observed a inferior
fairness than a linear model. Extending our work to a larger class of algorithms would
boost the accuracy of 2SDR on some datasets where non-linearity is important.
• Economic impact of fairness constraint: Fairness adjustment may inﬂuence the
incentive of the agents. In hiring decision, the Similar to afﬁrmative action,
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3. SO YOU THINK YOU ARE SAFE?
IMPLICATIONS OF QUALITY UNCERTAINTY
IN SECURITY SOFTWARE
3.1 Introduction
Over the past few years, the importance of information security has become increasingly apparent not only for organizations but also societies. Security software, which
serves as the front line of defense against cyber threats, has been widely adopted and
has become essential to users. However, despite the availability and variety that security
software has to offer, its ability to protect the user is still far from perfect. For example,
only about a half of 47 major antivirus software in 2014 could detect new threats on
the release date while 10% of them still failed to detect threats a year after the release
(Vigna, 2014). This lack of quality issue is especially important as end-users tend to
have limited knowledge regarding information security (?, e.g.,)]katz2005effect, albrechtsen2007qualitative and thus falsely believe in the quality of the security software they
adopt. This “false sense of security” among end-users that they tend to overestimate
the quality of the security software they adopt has been documented in several studies
(?, e.g.,)]guo2013humanfactor,mcafee2013smallbus. An extreme example that illustrates
this behavior is the android application named “Virus shield,” which was sold as a security
application for $3.99 in the Google Play store and became the top-selling application with
more than 30,000 downloads and 5-star ratings in only a week. However, a few days later,
a security expert discovered that it actually does absolutely nothing (Andow et al., 2016).
Because of this false sense of security, an individual who adopts security protection
might wrongly alter her behavior by embracing a higher level of risk (such as downloading
or executing ﬁles from unknown sources more promptly), thus somewhat offsetting the
level of protection she obtains by adopting the security product. This risk compensa-
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tion behavior is similar to the well-known “Peltzman Effect,” which was introduced to
the literature in a study of the effectiveness of the seatbelt regulation. The study found
that seatbelt induces drivers to drive less safely (Peltzman, 1975), which may lead to
the increase in the number of non-fatal accidents (Cohen and Einav, 2003). The risk
implication because of information asymmetry between the perception and the reality of
the quality of the security software can be extensive, as highlighted in the prior works (?,
e.g.,)]christin2012s,warkentin2012areyousure. Yet, most game theoretic models in the domain of information security do not account for information asymmetry or its consequence
in their analysis e.g. (Arora et al., 2006; ?). Their welfare analyses are conducted assuming
that consumer expectations are accurate. What do inaccurate consumer expectations mean
for social welfare? This question is the key focus of our study.
Our model incorporates several distinctive features regarding consumer behavior. First,
we allow users to receive information regarding the quality of security software before
making purchasing decisions. We assume that ill-informed consumers receive biased information regarding the software quality while the well-informed consumers, on the other
hand, receive the information pertaining to the true quality of security software. Each
consumer is unaware whether she belongs to the ill- or well-informed segment when she
makes her purchasing decisions under this uncertainty. Following that, after making a
purchasing decision, each consumer decides on the extent of engaging in activities that
create value in their eyes yet potentially harm them. Finally, consumers realize their utility
that is dependent on the risky behavior they exerted, the quality of the product consumed,
and their own preference. In this manner, we account for the uncertainty in quality as well
as risk compensation behavior in the consumer’s utility function, an aspect which is a novel
feature of our setup. In such a market, we study the implications of a monopolistic vendor
offering to sell a product by choosing its price and quality.
Our study yields particularly interesting insights into welfare implications. First, although the amount of bias (i.e., the difference between the true quality of security software
and that of consumer perception) may appear to have a negative impact on society, we
ﬁnd that social welfare could actually increase as the amount of bias increases. Second, in
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some circumstances, society is better off even without the security software in the market–
it is because the negative impact of over-estimation outweighs the beneﬁt of adopting such
software. Third, social welfare is not maximized even when consumers know about the
proportion of well- and ill-informed consumers. We provide insights into these seemingly
counterintuitive results.
In the next section, we review the literature that relates to our paper. In Section 3.3,
we describe the formulation and basic elements of the quantitative model we propose in
this study. Section 3.4 analyzes the existence of equilibrium and related observations
in the model and subsequently describes the implication of the welfare parameters. We
then generalize our model by providing several alternative speciﬁcations in Section 3.5.
Finally, in Section 3.6, we discuss our ﬁndings and conclude our research with managerial
implications, contributions, limitations, and future research avenues.

3.2

Literature Review
In this section, we survey the literature in four different streams related to our study.

First, we present a survey of prior literature that discusses the differences between perception and reality. Second, we review the literature in the domain of an individual’s risk
compensation behavior. Third, we explore previous literature that studies the implication
of product quality uncertainty. Lastly, we survey the literature on the economics of information security.

3.2.1

Perception versus Reality

The difference between perception and reality is one of the classical topics that has
been widely discussed in the philosophy literature e.g.,(Sellars et al., 1963; ?; ?). The
implications of such differences have been studied in various domains to explain a wide
range of phenomena. Examples include the relationships between environmental measures
and physical activity in medicine (Kirtland et al., 2003); the concept of disavowal in
psychology (Basch, 1983); and the failures in ﬁnancial report auditing (Chenok, 1994). In
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the speciﬁc context of information security, the difference between perception and reality
corresponds to users’ inability to accurately estimate the level of protection they obtain by
adopting security technologies. In fact, (Chellappa and Pavlou, 2002) use a survey to show
that consumers’ perceived information security is not necessarily the same as the objective
assessment of potential threats and that this false perception can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
consumer trust in electronic commerce transactions. Furthermore, many industry-based
studies ﬁnd that the gap between consumers’ perception and reality tends to make users
overly optimistic and creates a phenomenon called “false sense of security” among endusers (Guo, 2013), small business owners (Ragan, 2013), and non-IT executives (Dipietro,
2014). (Hui, 2010) captures this behavior in a laboratory experiment and concludes that a
strong security software brand could induce users to overestimate the level of security they
would attain from using the software, especially among users with low levels of knowledge
about information security. Despite several empirical studies suggesting that a gap exists
between consumers’ perception and reality, most of the prior works in the context of information security that utilize a game-theoretic model do not model the difference explicitly.
Regarding the theoretical modeling of this issue and studying the implications, we are
only aware of the advance selling context where it has been done so e.g.,(Xie and Shugan,
2001; ?). A distinctive feature of our model is that we consider the variation between the
realized and expected utilities when studying the implication of information asymmetry
in the information security context. Information asymmetry can manifest in terms of risk
compensation behavior or a lemon market-like situation. The next two subsections survey
the previous literature related to those issues.

3.2.2 Risk Compensation Behavior
This stream of research analyzes how perception and reality not being identical translates into risk compensation behavior by the consumers. The well-known and controversial1 Peltzman effect (Peltzman, 1975) demonstrates that drivers tend to embrace greater
1

A few other papers argue against the Peltzman effect e.g.,(Graham and Garber, 1984).
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accident risk because they feel safer when wearing a seat belt. He concludes that although
the regulation could reduce the risk of death from an accident, compared with an unregulated market, this reduction is offset by the fact that drivers tend to embrace greater
accident risk with the presence of seat belts. Many follow-up studies have shown similar
behaviors in other contexts. For example, (Rudin-Brown and Jamson, 2013) examine
Munich taxi drivers with and without anti-lock braking systems (ABS) and posit that
drivers who operate ABS-equipped vehicles are more likely to create trafﬁc conﬂicts. In
addition, (Prasad and Jena, 2014) invoke the Peltzman effect to explain why some health
care interventions, which seem noble, fail to yield their intended beneﬁts. (Vrolix, 2006)
provides a comprehensive review of related literature and concludes that the magnitude
of such risk compensation behavior varies depending on the context. For example, even
though the number of accident may increase because of the risk compensation behavior in
the classic case of seat belt, the number of fatal accident may decrease because of the seat
belt.2
The potential issue of risk compensation behavior in the context of information security
has been recently raised in the research community (Christin, 2011). However, we are only
aware of one prior study in this area which conducts a laboratory experiment to show that
users tend to ignore security advice and open themselves to unknown risk when incentives
exist to encourage such behavior (Christin et al., 2012). (Warkentin et al., 2012) also
argue in their study that consumers in information security markets are likely to exhibit
risk compensation behavior. They propose several potential research methodologies for
behavioral researchers to further study this topic. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the ﬁrst to incorporate risk compensation behavior into the model of consumer and provide
insights into how risk compensation behavior affects both individual and social welfare.
2

Note that the Peltzman effect in the prior literature accounts jointly for both the direct effect (i.e., engaging
in risky behavior) as well as the indirect effect (i.e., learning that occurs from engaging in risky behavior).
For instance, (Pope and Tollison, 2010) study the behavior of NASCAR drivers. Here, an accident caused by
one driver could also affect other drivers. Hence, their behavior may reﬂect the indirect effect as drivers may
drive more cautiously when other drivers are reckless. Even in this context, the Peltzman effect is recognized.
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3.2.3

Implication of Quality Uncertainty

While the previous subsection reviews the literature that focuses on the effect of perception versus reality on the demand side, this subsection surveys papers that examine the
supply side implications of information asymmetry. Note that one main reason for the
difference between perception and reality is that consumers face uncertainty about quality.
Regarding market implications in the face of quality uncertainty, one of the seminal papers
is (Akerlof, 1970), which investigates the second-hand automobile market. He concludes
that such uncertainty can push good quality products out of the market and collapse the
market as a result. Other areas of management have also observed this phenomenon, including ﬁnance e.g.,(Beatty and Ritter, 1986); accounting e.g.,(DeAngelo, 1981); operation
management e.g.,(Lim, 2000); and information systems (Dimoka et al., 2012). A number
of papers have followed up on potential avenues to overcome the problems in Akerlof’s
lemon market. One such idea is to build a reputation system e.g.,(Resnick et al., 2000),
and papers have demonstrated support for such a system e.g.,(Gefen et al., 2003; Ba and
Pavlou, 2002). Others have also considered governmental interventions but have concluded
that reducing uncertainty by imposing government regulation alone might not be effective
e.g.,(Hoffer and Pratt, 1987). As we demonstrate later, quality uncertainty does indeed
play an important role in moderating the welfare implications in the information security
market.

3.2.4

Economics of Information Security

In this subsection, we review analytical research in the information security context that
is closely related to our study. Particularly, we survey two substreams of prior literature
that share key modeling details with our work, including papers that study the market
for security software and a ﬁrm’s decisions on product quality, and the implications of
policymaker and government intervention. However, this paper is signiﬁcantly different
from the prior works surveyed in this subsection as we allow users to be uncertain about
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product quality. We are not aware of any previous work in this area that has incorporated
this aspect of information uncertainty into an analytical model.
The market for information security software has been modeled and analyzed in the
literature. Its unique characteristics (e.g., the market is highly competitive yet the coverage
is low) have been established by (Dey et al., 2012), who model the market for security
software in the presence of hackers, different types of attacks, and network effects; and
argue that these elements contribute to the uniqueness of the market. In addition to the
characteristics of the market, the welfare implications of the market entities has also been
studied in a scenario where software patch availability is restricted (Kannan et al., 2016).
In such a case, the vendor can strategically choose the price and maintenance decisions to
take advantage of the presence of the hacker in the market. Furthermore, a ﬁrm’s decision
on product quality has also been studied in many contexts. For example, (August and
Tunca, 2006) incorporate network externalities to analyze different patching policies to
manage network security. They show that patching policy is not a one-size-ﬁts-all approach
in the sense that the optimal policy differs based on context (e.g., proprietary software
vs. freeware, patching cost, and security risk) and that using the right user incentive can
signiﬁcantly improve software generated value and ﬁrm proﬁts. In addition, the trade-offs
between tolerating illegal software usage and enjoying positive network effect from higher
number of users has been analytically analyzed (Lahiri, 2012). The results demonstrate
that the conventional wisdom, which suggests that companies could beneﬁt from the illegal
distribution of their software product due to positive network externalities, might not be true
when patching is also considered. Moreover, (Arora et al., 2006) build an economics model
based on a ﬁrm’s trade-off decision between selling error-prone software early and the cost
of ﬁxing it later. They show that the ﬁrm has incentives to release software with more
bugs early when the market is sufﬁciently large, in contrast with the case of manufacturers
of physical goods. Our model is constructed based on key modeling details proposed by
the literature in this substream. Meanwhile, we incorporate consumers’ risk compensation
behavior into the model and allow the ﬁrm to make decisions based on the presence of
quality uncertainty among consumers.
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The second substream of literature examines the implications for policymaker and government intervention in the context of information security. On the one hand, the intervention has been shown to beneﬁt society. For example, (Kannan and Telang, 2005) conclude
that the case where companies sell a subscription for software vulnerability disclosures
almost always underperforms the approach where such disclosures are provided for free
by government-subsidized entities. On the other hand, such an intervention has also been
shown in other contexts to be suboptimal. For instance, (Png and Wang, 2009) ﬁnd that
enforcement by the government against attackers is less effective compared with educating
end-users, especially when attacks are targeted. Furthermore, different interventions can
lead to different outcomes. For instance, (Chen and Png, 2003) study several cases of
government policy on copyright enforcement and ﬁnd that the case where a government
subsidizes a legitimate purchase leads to higher social welfare compared with the case of
a ﬁne for piracy or a tax on copying medium. Given the conﬂicting ﬁndings from the previous literature, our work provides insights into the welfare implications for policymaker
intervention in the presence of quality uncertainty about security software.
In summary, the literature in subsection 3.2.1 has demonstrated that a large portion
of security software users tend to be overly optimistic about the level of security their
software offers. In addition, previous works in subsection 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 have shown that
risk compensation behavior, particularly drawing upon the Peltzman effect, implies that this
uncertainty could adversely affect the ﬁrm’s decision and social welfare. However, much
of the literature in the economics of information security has not considered modeling
this aspect. Our paper utilizes a game-theoretic model to provide insights into the resulting
welfare implications. We are among the ﬁrst to provide a formal analysis of the implications
of consumer uncertainty in the context of the security software market.

3.3 Model
We begin by highlighting two key features of our model. The ﬁrst feature is that
we capture the consumers’ uncertainty regarding the nature of the security software by
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assuming that they cannot directly observe the software’s true quality. Instead, they observe
a signal that contains imperfect information of the quality. Furthermore, they are aware that
the signal may be noisy. The signals lead to beliefs about quality and play an important role
in determining whether the consumers purchase the software and also how they generate
value from the software. The second key feature is that, after consumers decide whether or
not to purchase the security product, they engage in value-adding but risky activities based
on their perception of the software quality. The main intention of this feature is not only to
capture the Peltzman-like effect in the information security context but also to analyze the
effect of misperception on the welfare parameters.
We study such behaviors of consumers in a monopolistic market with the vendor choosing the security quality q and price p. Our analysis of the monopolistic market3 can be
justiﬁed as follows. Information security can be considered as an information good. As
(Jones and Mendelson, 2011) note, the markets for information goods tend to result in a
monopolistic market. Further, ours is one of the ﬁrst papers in the information security
context to analyze welfare implications caused by consumer uncertainty. A monopolistic
model is useful in providing insights about the trade-offs that are germane to this setup.
Next, we describe the two primary players in our models, the vendor and the consumers.

3.3.1

Vendor

The way we model the vendor is fairly standard and is described ﬁrst. In this market, the
monopolistic vendor realizes a demand D(p, q), which varies with the price p and quality
q chosen by the vendor. We ignore the ﬁxed cost of producing the security software and
consider the marginal cost of producing additional copies to be zero. However, the software
quality is a consequence of the maintenance effort, such as virus signatures that need to
be identiﬁed in antivirus software. For this purpose, we assume the cost function c(q) is
strictly convex, strictly increasing in quality, and zero when the quality is zero. Also, we
3

Although we recognize that in reality, the market for security software typically involves a number of vendors
(e.g., antivirus, backup software, host-based intrusion prevention systems), a market also exists with a limited
number of vendors (e.g., data-loss prevention, security compliance).
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assume c (0) = 0 and lim c (q) = ∞. The vendor’s choice is to maximize the proﬁt
q→∞

π = p D(p, q) − c(q). Therefore, the vendor chooses the optimal price and quality to
maximize its proﬁt4 :
(p , q ) = arg max π.
p,q

3.3.2

Consumers

Our modeling of consumers is distinctive and is described below. For ease of understanding, we separate the explanation of our modeling into several steps as follows:
Heterogeneous consumer utility function: The consumer utility function involves three
parameters x, q, and β in the form u(x; q, β). The parameter β ∈ (0, 1) captures consumer
heterogeneity regarding valuations that consumers obtain from engaging in digital activities. It is assumed to follow a distribution whose pdf is f (β). Each consumer is aware of her
own β. The parameter x is the amount of value-adding but risky behavior that the consumer
engages in. For example, the recent articles about White House aides using the not-sosecure Conﬁde app to engage in potentially private conversations believing in the “militarygrade security” encryption, even though it may not be so (Newman, 2017) illustrates the
risky behavior some consumers might engage in. Eventually, we will endogenize x. The
term q is the quality of the security software employed. If the consumer does not purchase
the software, we assume that she generates the utility u(x; 0, β).
Structure of the quality signal: Let us assume that consumers, independent of their
β, receive a signal q̃ that contains imperfect information of the quality.5 For simplicity,
we assume that there are only two types of signals: accurate signals and biased signals.
For instance, a consumer may receive an accurate evaluation if she consumes information
from credible technical reports about security software quality but may receive a biased
signal from paid reviews or sponsored reports that exaggerate the quality of the security
4

In our single period model, we do not explicitly allow the reputation to affect the ﬁrm’s choice of p and q.
However, by incorporating a separate reputation cost that is a function of quality, we can demonstrate that the
results remain qualitatively similar.
5
Assuming uncertainty on product quality is common in the literature in the economics of information. For a
comprehensive literature review, see (Stiglitz, 2000).
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software. Let consumers who receive the accurate signal q̃ = q be referred to as wellinformed consumers, and those who receive the biased signal q̃ = g(q; s) be referred to as
ill-informed consumers. Here, s represents the amount of bias. If P r(q̃|q) represents the
distribution of the signal q̃ conditional on the true quality q, the consumer infers P r(q|q̃)
when making the purchasing decisions. For our analysis, we assume:
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
σ
if q̃ = g(q; s)
⎪
⎪
P r(q̃|q) = 1 − σ if q̃ = q
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩0
otherwise,

(3.1)

where σ represents the probability of observing a biased signal.
Assumptions regarding the biased signal (g(q; s)): First of all, we assume that s is
a common knowledge. Second, we assume g(q; s) > q, which conveys the meaning
that we only focus on overestimating consumers. Note that the ill-informed consumers’
misestimation is a function of an exogenous parameter s which captures the amount of
bias. Therefore, a large s means a large difference between perception and reality, i.e.,
∂
∂s

(g(q; s) − q) > 0 (obviously, it implies that

∂g(q;s)
∂s

> 0). Moreover, g(q; 0) = q, i.e., if

there is no bias, the perceived quality is identical to the true quality of the security software.
Finally, we assume

∂g(q;s)
∂q

> 0, meaning that the biased signal takes larger value with the

larger actual quality.
Redeﬁning some variables: Later in Section 3.5 of the paper, we allow for the generalization of more than two types of signals. Therefore, to facilitate those discussions,
we redeﬁne some variables. The total mass of consumers is normalized to one. Each
consumer belongs to a segment t ∈ {1, 2}, where t = 1 represents ill-informed consumers
who receive a biased signal, and t = 2 represents well-informed consumers who receive an
accurate signal. Let q̃t be the signal observed by group t, i.e., q̃1 = g(q; s) and q̃2 = q.
Recall that the probability a consumer observes a biased signal is σ. We denote the
proportion of consumers of a group t as σt , where σ1 = σ and σ2 = 1 − σ. These are
assumed to be known to the vendor. For ease of readability, we interchangeably use σ with
σ1 and (1 − σ) with σ2 .
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Getting to P r(q|q̃): Generally speaking, as mentioned earlier, consumers would infer
P r(q|q̃) for decision-making. To capture the reality of the uncertainty of the market,
we assume that consumers are not only unaware of true quality but also of how likely
their signal is to be biased. Similar issue has been recently highlighted in the context
of news. For example, anecdotal evidence has suggested that consumers are unable to
properly evaluate the reliability of the media source e.g.,(Swartz and della Cava, 2016;
Silverman and Singer-Vine, 2016). Relatedly, a formal research article has also reached
the same conclusion (Wineburg and McGrew, 2016). Therefore, we allow consumers
to believe in a data generating process, Pˆ rt (q̃|q), which may differ across segments and
also differs from P r(q̃|q) as deﬁned earlier in Equation 3.1. Using Bayesian updates,
Pˆrt (q|q̃) =

Pˆr t (q̃|q)Pˆr t (q)
.
Pˆrt (q̃)

Assuming non-informative prior, we deﬁne:

Pˆrt (q|q̃) =

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
r
⎪
⎪ t

if q = g −1 (q̃; s)

1 − rt
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩0

if q = q̃
otherwise.

Note that rt is the subjective probability of the signal being biased. Also with this
construct, rt can be interpreted as the chance that a consumer in segment t believes that a
signal she receives is biased, which may or may not be the true probability σ. Intuitively,
from the perspective of consumers in segment t who observe signal q̃t , there are two
possibilities: the signal they observe may be the true quality, or it is biased. In the former
case, the true quality is simply q = q̃t . In the latter case, g(q; s) = q̃t , thus the true quality is
q = g −1 (q̃t ; s). In the context involving two types, true quality for an ill-informed consumer
is q̃1 = g(q; s) as the signal indicates, or it could be g −1 (q̃1 ; s) = g −1 (g(q; s); s) = q if the
signal is biased. Similarly, for a well-informed consumer, the true quality can be either
q̃2 = q or g −1 (q̃2 ; s) = g −1 (q; s). To summarize the different quality levels, Figure 3.1
illustrates the notations of product qualities in our study. The arrows marked horizontally
demonstrate the possible quality levels that the consumer suspects she is in. Note that
because g(q; s) is strictly monotone in s,

∂g −1 (q;s)
∂s

< 0. Note that we construct the main

model such that the amount of bias (s) has only one value for all consumers. When we
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generalize our model in Section 3.5.1, we allow each segment of consumers to have its
own s.

Figure 3.1.: Notations of perceived quality by the two consumer segments

Expected utility based on belief on quality: Given the belief on quality derived in the
previous section, a consumer’s perceived expected utility is simply
Ũt (x; q̃t , β) = (1 − rt )u(x; q̃t , β) + rt u(x; g −1 (q̃t ), β).

(3.2)

Optimally perceived risky behavior + Optimally perceived expected utility: Based on
the perceived expected utility from Equation 3.2, we compute the optimally perceived risky
behavior as xt = arg maxx Ũt (x; q̃t , β) and the corresponding expected utility is simply
deﬁned as Ũt (β, q). A consumer purchases the product if and only if Ũt (β, q) − p >
Uno (β) ≡ maxx u(x; 0, β), where Uno is the utility if the consumer does not purchase the
product.
Properties of the realized utility function: Because the perceived utility might be different from the realized utility, we next deﬁne the properties of the realized utility function
for a consumer, which we earlier denoted as u(x; q, β).
1. We assume that u(x; q, β) is strictly concave and continuous in x (i.e., the payoff is
concave with respect to the risky behavior) and continuous and strictly increasing
in q and β (i.e., the payoff increases as the product quality increases or a consumer
possesses higher β).
2. For any β, x, and q, we assume that

∂2u
∂β∂x

> 0, i.e., a consumer with higher β

generates a larger marginal utility from the extra level of risky behavior.
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3. Let

∂2u
∂q∂x

> 0 for any x and β. This characterization is consistent with the perception

that a consumer can enjoy more risky behavior with less security concern when the
quality of security software is higher.
Using these results, we can establish that:
Lemma 3.3.1 For a given β, the perceived expected utility is higher for the ill-informed
consumer than for the well-informed one. Hence, the market share from the well-informed
consumers is smaller than or equal to that from ill-informed ones. That is, Ũ1 > Ũ2 and
β2 ≥ β1 .

Model Specialization
For the sake of tractability in our analysis, we impose additional assumptions on the
consumer’s perceived expected utility. First, we assume that the probability density function f (β) follows the uniform distribution. Second, we assume that the perceived expected
utility at the chosen amount of risky behavior x is functionally separable as:
U˜t (β, q) = Ũt (xt , q̃t , β) = βm(q)nt (s, rt ),

(3.3)

where m(q) is strictly concave in q, and nt (s, rt ) is a function of s and rt that is different
depending on the consumer segment t. Finally, we assume that m(q = 0) = 0.6 Here, the
m(q) term captures how the quality of the security product affects consumers’ perceived
expected utility. This effect is similar to the Akerlof’s lemon market effect (Akerlof, 1970),
which we will explain in detail at the end of section 3.4.1. In the meantime, the term
nt (s, rt ) captures the “Peltzman-like” effect for consumers in segment t. Speciﬁcally,
nt (s, rt ) endogenizes, within the perceived expected utility expression, the consumers’
risky behavior as a function of the bias that the consumers have regarding the software
quality and the likelihood that a biased signal is received. The separability assumption
delivers two important dimensions. First, it improves the tractability of our model. Second,
more importantly, it helps us to separately study the impact of the two effects on consumers’
6

Other assumptions such as m(q) ≥ 0 if q ≥ q̂ and vice-versa will generate similar results.
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perceived expected utility. Additionally, our main insights remain intact even though the
separability assumption is relaxed, which we will demonstrate in Section 3.5.3. Based on
the assumptions mentioned here and the assumptions discussed earlier, we have:
Lemma 3.3.2 m(q) is a continuous, differentiable, and strictly increasing function of q.
nt (s, rt ) is a continuous and differentiable function of s and rt .
and

∂nt (s,rt )
∂rt

∂n1 (s,r1 )
∂s

> 0;

∂n2 (s,r2 )
∂s

< 0;

≤ 0 for t = {1, 2} but the inequality is strict only if s > 0. The utility from not

purchasing the security software, Uno (β) = 0 for any β.
The lemma shows that m(q) is a well-behaved function of q. In addition, the change
in nt (s, rt ) with respect to s and rt allows us to observe that the perceived expected utility
of ill- (well-) informed consumers increases (decreases) with respect to s, and that the
perceived expected utility decreases with respect to rt . Before we progress forward, Table
3.1 summarizes the variables we have deﬁned so far.

3.4 Equilibrium Results
We solve this two-stage game by computing the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
using backward induction. Recall that the ﬁrst stage is the vendor’s decision on quality and
price, and that the second stage is the consumers’ purchasing and usage behaviors.

3.4.1 Consumers’ Actions: Second Stage
Consumers choose whether to buy security software or not based on the price and
perceived quality. Fix consumer segment t = {1, 2}. A consumer purchases the product
if βm(q)nt (s, rt ) − p > 0 but not otherwise. If βt represents the indifferent consumer in
segment t, only consumers with β ∈ (βt , 1) purchase the product (because the consumer
utility is monotonically increasing with β). Based on the expected utility function, βt =
min{ m(q)npt (s,rt ) , 1}. By Lemma 3.3.1, β2 > β1 .
If the consumer’s heterogeneity parameter β is kept constant, the perceived expected
utility when she is ill-informed will be higher than that when she is well-informed. As a
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Table 3.1.: List of variables in the model
u(x; q, β)

realized consumer utility

x

amount of risky behavior

q

quality of the security software

β

consumer heterogeneity

t

consumer group. 1 for ill-informed and 2 for well-informed.

q̃t

quality signal for consumer group t

g(q; s)

quality signal for ill-informed consumer (q̃1 )

s

amount of bias in quality signal

σt

proportion of the market with consumer group t

rt

subjective probability of the signal being biased for group t

Ũt

maximized perceived expected utility of consumer group t

m(q)
nt (s, rt )

quality term in Ut
information uncertainty term in Ut

p

price of the security software

π

proﬁt of the vendor

result, the cutoff βt to purchase the product is lower for the ill-informed. Following that,
the total demand function can be deﬁned as:
2

D(p, q) =

σt (1 − βt ) ,
t=1

which the vendor uses to maximize proﬁt by choosing p and q. Two scenarios are possible
with respect to demand. One scenario is that only the ill-informed consumers (t = 1) will
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purchase the product; this happens when β2 = 1. In the other scenario, both consumer
segments purchase the product. In order to characterize the equilibrium, we deﬁne
Wt =

σt
t
t =1 nt (s,rt )
t
t =1 σt

, and

(3.4)
τ

W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) =

Wt |t ∈ arg max
τ

σt

Wτ−1

.

(3.5)

t =1

We refer to the term W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) as the aggregated distrust factor and will interpret it in
the following Lemma. Given the deﬁnition, we characterize the equilibrium of the game as
follows.
Proposition 3.4.1 The optimal vendor proﬁt and optimal quality are non-zero, ﬁnite, unique,
and continuous in all the parameters s, rt , and σt . The equilibrium price is:
p ∈

m(q )
,
2W (s, r1 , r2 , σ)

and it is unique iff W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) is a singleton. If W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) = W1 , only the illinformed consumers are served; if W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) = W2 , both well- and ill-informed
consumers are served. The implicit function that ﬁnds the unique optimal quality is
m (q )
4

t

σt

Wt−1 − c (q ) = 0 if Wt ∈ W (s, r1 , r2 , σ).

t =1

This proposition highlights the beneﬁt of deﬁning the aggregated distrust factor. It
shows that in our framework, the equilibrium behavior of the vendor can be simply expressed as a function of the aggregate distrust factor. Importantly, any parameters that
deﬁne the information structure of the quality only inﬂuence the vendor through this factor.
Next, before we understand how the equilibrium changes with various exogenous parameters, we focus on explaining the aggregate distrust factor term, W (s, r1 , r2 , σ). The explanation is clearer if one understands how the exogenous parameters affect W (s, r1 , r2 , σ).
Lemma 3.4.1 Wt ∈ W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) is non decreasing in rt and non increasing in σ.
With respect to s, the function decreases when W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) = W1 but may increase
or decrease when W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) = W2 .
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Note speciﬁcally how the variation is with respect to the bias. First, consider the case
where only the ill-informed consumers serve the market. As the bias increases, n1 (s, r1 )
increases, and so the trust that ill-informed consumers place in the software increases.
Hence, a larger market share of ill-informed consumers purchases the product. Since this
term n1 (s, r1 ) enters the W1 inversely as follows W1 =

1
,
n1 (s,r1 )

we claim that the term

W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) accounts for the distrust. Next, after observing that W2 =

σ1
n1 (s,r1 )

+

σ2
n2 (s,r2 )

when both consumer segments purchase the product, we extend our interpretation to this
case also. Here, the notion of trust is weighted in proportion to consumer segments,
thus the term aggregate distrust factor. Because the factor n2 (s, r2 ) makes well-informed
consumers more cautious, the distrust factor only increases when both consumer segments
are present. Relatedly, if ill-informed consumers dominate the market (i.e., σ → 1), the
term W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) decreases with respect to s. On the opposite end, if the well-informed
consumers dominate the market (i.e., σ → 0), the term W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) increases.
Explaining the effects of rt and σ on W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) is straightforward. A higher rt
implies that consumers are more suspicious of the observed quality. Therefore, the distrust
factor W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) naturally increases as a consequence. When σ increases, a larger
proportion of consumers perceive overestimated quality. With debiasing, it implies that
consumers as a whole will be more trustful of the product. Hence, the value of the distrust
factor decreases. Now, we use the results of these sensitivity analyses to consider the effect
of the exogenous parameters on the equilibrium.
Theorem 3.4.1 When the parameters change, the following hold at the equilibrium.
1. If rt increases (equivalently, decreases): the quality and the proﬁt decrease (increase); if the price is a singleton, it also decreases (increases).
2. If σ increases (decreases): the quality and the proﬁt increase (decrease); if the price
is a singleton, it also increases (decrease).
3. If s increases: the proﬁt, quality, and price may decrease.
The implication of the change in the amount of bias, s, on the vendor’s proﬁt is speciﬁcally insightful. The conventional wisdom usually suggests that the vendor always beneﬁts
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from the presence of information asymmetry. Some even suspect that the vendor promotes
uncertainty for its own beneﬁt. In contrast with popular belief, we do not ﬁnd it to be
necessarily true. Under certain circumstances, such as the case where the population of the
ill-informed consumers is sufﬁciently large, the vendor indeed enjoys higher proﬁt as the
bias increases. However, under other circumstances, such as the case where ill-informed
consumers are not sufﬁciently sensitive to the bias, the vendor could actually be worse off
when the bias increases. We next explain how price, quality, and proﬁts change with bias.
Note that the effect of s on price, quality, and proﬁts can be either positive or negative.
If the vendor serves only ill-informed consumers (i.e., W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) = W1 ), the effect of
increasing s is equivalent to the effect of increasing σ since it only increases the overall
consumers’ perception on software quality. Therefore, at the margin, not only the vendor’s
choice of quality and price, but the vendor’s proﬁts also increase. This corresponds to the
conventional wisdom mentioned in the previous paragraph. However, when both segments
of consumers are in the market, an increase in s may no longer be straightforward as in
the previous scenario. Consider speciﬁcally when the portion of ill-informed consumers is
sufﬁciently low. Then, an increase in s negatively affects consumers’ average perception
instead (because of the debiasing). Therefore, at the margin, the value for the vendor from
increasing the quality decreases – leading to a decrease in equilibrium price, quality, and
proﬁts.
Speciﬁcally with respect to the variation of quality, we wish to highlight the Akerlof’s
lemon market-like effect ((Akerlof, 1970)) that can occur. When a large number of wellinformed consumers exist in the market, they lose trust in the software quality because of
bias. This tends to decrease the W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) term, and so the vendor’s incentive to provide high quality decreases. It is the equivalent of the vendor offering only “lemons.” The
implication of the “Akerlof-like effect” is clearer with regard to the welfare implications.
The other effects identiﬁed in the theorem are fairly straightforward. Note that an
increase in consumer suspicion (rt ) negatively affects the equilibrium price and quality. At
the margin, the value from increasing quality decreases. This also means that the consumer
surplus that can be extracted as proﬁt decreases. On the other hand, an increase in the
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proportion of ill-informed consumers (σ) has the opposite effect. When σ increases, more
consumers observe positively biased software quality. Therefore, the vendor’s marginal
value from increasing the quality is higher. As a result, the software quality is higher and
the price is also higher. For the same reason, the proﬁt is also higher.

3.4.2

Welfare Implications

In this subsection, we analyze the implication of information uncertainty in consumer
surplus and social welfare. For consumer segment t, the consumer surplus is deﬁned as:
βt∗ (p,q)

CS =

σt
t=1,2

0

1

Uno (β) +

βt∗ (p,q)

(u(xt ; q, β) − p) dβ .

Social welfare is the sum of the vendor proﬁt, π(p , q ), and the consumer surplus, CS:
SW = CS + π(p , q ).
Next, we examine the welfare implications at the individual consumer level before
aggregating. We begin by considering the variation with respect to the amount of bias
s. We can separate the variation into three terms, where each corresponds to a different
effect. Speciﬁcally, the variation of consumer utility with respect to s can be expressed as
follows:
∂u(xt ; q, β)
∂u(xt ; q, β) ∂xt
∂u(xt ; q, β)
=
+
∂s
∂x
∂s
∂q
Peltzman-like effect

∂q
∂s
Akerlof-like effect

+

∂u(xt ; q, β) ∂q ∂xt
.(3.6)
∂x
∂s ∂q
Interaction effect

In the ﬁrst term, the Peltzman-like effect captures the consumer engaging in a suboptimal
level of risky behavior because of quality misperception. For the well-informed (equiv.
ill-informed), that effect is positive (resp. negative). As regards the second part of the ﬁrst
term,

∂x∗t
,
∂s

notice that increasing s decreases (resp. increases) x. Hence, the ﬁrst term is

always negative, independent of the consumer segment.
The second term accounts for the Akerlof-like effect. The part,

∂q ∗
,
∂s

corresponds to

change in software quality because of bias. It can be both positive and negative, depending
on whether the aggregated distrust factor W increases or decreases with respect to s. The
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ﬁrst part, however, is always positive. As a result, the second term is overall positive if and
only if

∂q ∗
∂s

is positive.

As evident, the last term captures the interaction of the two effects and includes three
parts. The last part

∂x∗t
∂q

is always positive. The other two parts correspond to the previous

two paragraphs. The overall term captures how the consumers’ choice of risky behavior
is affected by the change in security software quality caused by the Akerlof-like effect
and ends up changing the Peltzman-like effect as a result. For instance, if the quality
increases as s increases (i.e.,

∂q ∗
∂s

> 0), the perceived quality is further higher, prompting

the consumers to choose a larger xt . Consequentially, the realized utility of ill-informed
consumers decreases because their choice of xt becomes further away from the true optimal point, which they would have chosen had they know the true quality of the security
software. For the well-informed ones, the same logic leads to increased realized utility.
Note that a similar set of insights can also be obtained for other exogenous parameters,
except for some slight changes. For example, the ﬁrst term is zero when considering the
variation with respect to the proportion of ill-informed consumer σ. These effects when
combined across consumers provide insights about consumer surplus.
Next, we investigate the change in social welfare, and also the vendor proﬁt, with
respect to s. In that regard, recall that there is a case where the equilibrium price is a
doubleton. For the sake of simplicity, we present here the change in the social welfare with
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respect to the change of s when the price is a singleton. Note that qualitatively similar
results can also be established when the price is not a singleton.
∂SW
∂s

1

=

σt
t=1,2

βt∗

∂u(xt ; q , β) ∂xt
dβ
∂xt
∂s
Peltzman-like effect
1

∂q
∂s

+

σt
t=1,2

βt∗

∂u(xt ; q , β)
dβ − c (q )
∂q

Akerlof-like effect
1

+

σt
t=1,2

βt∗

∂q ∂u(xt ; q , β) ∂xt
dβ
∂s
∂xt
∂q
Second order effect

−

σt
t=1,2

∂β ∂q
∂β ∂p
∂βt
+ t
+ t
∂p ∂s
∂s
∂q ∂s

(
u(xt ; q , βt )

(3.7)

Demand change

Compare with individual utility, two additional components enter the equation in studying the variation of the social welfare with respect to s. One is the marginal cost term
interacting with the Akerlof-like effect. That is because when the quality changes, the
cost incurred by the vendor also changes. The second change is the shift in demand.
When s changes, both due to the Peltzman-like effect and Akerlof-like effect, the purchase
decisions of the consumers change. With s increasing, ill-informed consumers tend to purchase more, while well-informed consumers purchase less. When quality increases, both
consumer segments tend to purchase the product more. The demand change aggregates
these effects.
Theorem 3.4.2 Social welfare can increase with the amount of bias.
The Peltzman-like effect, as pointed out earlier, negatively impacts social welfare. From
the traditional perspective, the Akerlof-like effect can lead to market failures; hence, by
extrapolation, one may interpret its effect as also decreasing social welfare. For these
reasons, we expect the bias to have a negative impact on consumer and social welfare
metrics. In that regard, the theorem may seem counterintuitive.
Our analysis ﬁnds that the bias may have a positive impact on social welfare because
of the Akerlof-like effect. It allows ill-informed consumers to further overestimate the
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quality, which decreases the aggregated distrust factor. This in turn leads to well-informed
consumers also purchasing more. Consequently, the vendor has an incentive to marginally
improve the software quality. Thus, the social welfare may improve. Additionally, the
second order effect term identiﬁed in Equation 3.7 may contribute positively to social
welfare also – for example, if the proportion of ill-informed consumers is small and the
Akerlof-like effect is positive. When both these effects are combined, bias creates a positive
impact on social welfare.
Since we do not capture the welfare parameters in reduced form expressions, our next
objective is to provide insights based on some numerical simulations. Figure 3.2 plots the
changes to vendor proﬁt, consumer surplus, and social welfare with respect to the bias for
two speciﬁc values of σ. One can see that s = 0 yields the optimal social welfare when
σ is small (in Figure 3.2(a)), but that is not the case when σ is large (in Figure 3.2(b)).
These results can be readily understood from Equations 3.6 and 3.7. Note that when s
increases, ill-informed consumers contribute to social welfare through the Akerlof-like
effect by exhibiting higher trust in the quality but undermine it because of the Peltzman-like
effect by over-exerting risky behavior. When σ is large as in Figure 3.2(b), it corresponds
to more consumers receiving (upwardly) a biased signal. For that case, when s is relatively
small, the Akerlof-like effect dominates, and the increment in s only improves the welfare.
In contrast, when σ is small as in Figure 3.2(a), most of the consumers observe an unbiased
signal. They debias the signal even more if s increases, which harms the social welfare
through the Akerlof-like effect. In addition, their choice of risky-behavior also becomes
further from optimal. Thus, in the case where σ is small, a larger s does society no good.
In addition to the change in social welfare with respect to s, Figure 3.3 shows the
variation of social welfare when both s and r change. Recall that r represents the subjective
probability of the signal being biased. When r is small, consumers are naive in the sense
that they believe the signal that they observe. As a result, they do not put much weight
on debiasing the signal. In such a case, the change in s mostly inﬂuences ill-informed
consumers, and thus the increase in s can raise the social welfare because the Akerlof-like
effect is dominant. On the other hand, with a large r, consumers are suspicious of the
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(a)

(b)

Figure 3.2.: The changes in consumer surplus, the vendor surplus, and the social welfare
with respect to the amount of bias.
The utility function is u(x; β, q) =

√

βqx − λx and the quality perception is q̃1 = q(s + 1).

The cost function is c(q) = kq 2 . σ = .2 and r1 = r2 = .5 for the ﬁrst and σ = .6 and
r1 = r2 = .2 for the second graph. Other parameters are set to be k = .1 and λ = .05.

signal that they observe and put more weight on debiasing. Hence, an increase in s mostly
affects well-informed consumers and thus fails to improve social welfare. In addition, we
also observe that at the point where r is equal to σ, social welfare does not increase when
s increases. The following theorem proves another associated result.
Theorem 3.4.3 There exist scenarios where social and consumer welfare are higher without security software in the market.
This is an interesting result. In the previous explanations, we explained how the Akerloflike effect moderates the negative impact on social welfare because the value of the aggregated distrust factor decreases. Also, we explained how having some bias can improve
social welfare. However, when both the amount of bias and the proportion of overestimating consumers are large, social welfare can be worse than without any market. Figure
3.4 illustrates the same phenomenon. The ﬁrst two graphs represent social welfare, while
the last two graphs represent consumer surplus. The dark gray area corresponds to the
case where the welfare parameters are higher if security software exists, while the light
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(a)

(b)

Figure 3.3.: The social welfare evaluated with parameters s and r.
Note: r1 = r2 = r is assumed. The utility function, the quality perception, and the cost
function are the same as ﬁg 3.2. σ = .5 for (a) and σ = .9 for (b). Other parameters are set
equal to ﬁg 3.2.
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(a) Social welfare, rt = 0.1

(b) Social welfare, rt = 0.5

(c) Consumer surplus, rt = 0.1

(d) Consumer surplus, rt = 0.5

Figure 3.4.: The parameter region where the social welfare is larger with the market or
without the market.
Note: The utility function is u(x; β, q) =

√

βqx − λx. The quality perception is q̃1 =

q(s+1). The cost function is c(q) = kq 2 . The other parameters are set to be k = .1, λ = .05

gray region represents the case where the welfare parameters are actually lower if there is
security software in the market.7
7

One might wonder whether the results from Theorem 3.4.3 hold if we model a strategic hacker. Let
e(q, D(p, q)) be hackers’ effort level, which is a function of the quality of security software and the mass
of protected consumers. For simplicity, assume linear relationship e(q, D(p, q)) = αq + βD(p, q). As the
consumer and social welfare are continuous functions, it is obvious that there exists some small α and β that
the existence in Theorem 7 still holds. This may change the parameter region of which such a case arises, but
we can still show that such a case exists.
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3.5 Generalizations
In this section, we relax several assumptions from the main model and discuss results.

3.5.1

Multiple Consumer Segments

In our main model, we simplify consumers’ observation of security software quality by
assuming only two types of signals, biased and accurate signals. As a result, consumers
belong to one of the two segments, ill- and well-informed. In this subsection, we relax
such an assumption by allowing more than two types of signals. Let there be T consumer
segments each identiﬁed by t = 1, . . . , T and occurring in proportions σt , where

T
t=1

σt =

1. Deﬁne σ = {σ1 , . . . , σT }. The quality perceived by consumers in each segment is
q̃t = gt (q; st ). Let s = {sτ }τ =1,...,T be a vector of the amount of bias each segment
observes. For ease of representation, assume that the consumer segments are sorted in
terms of bias. Speciﬁcally, we assume that a larger t implies less bias. By construction,
gt (q; st ) > gt (q; st ) for ∀t < t . Let rt = {rtτ }τ =1,...,T be a vector of the weight that
consumer segment t puts on believing that he belongs to segment τ and, in that case, the
debiased quality is gτ−1 (q̃t ; sτ ). Therefore, Ũt = maxx

T
τ
−1
τ =1 rt u(x; gτ (q̃t ; sτ ), β).

As in

our main model, we further assume that the expected perceived utility can be separated into
two terms: Ũt = βm(q)nt (s, rt ). Here, nt (s, rt ) is smaller for larger t (i.e., nt (s, rt ) >
nt (s, rt )∀t < t ), which is consistent with the inﬂuence of the information uncertainty
being smaller for more well-informed consumers. Similar to Equations 3.4 and 3.5, we
deﬁne:
Wt =

σt
t
t =1 nt (s,rt )
t
t =1 σt

, and
τ

W (s, {rt }t=1,...,T , σ) =

Wt |t ∈ arg max
τ

σt

Wτ−1

.

t =1

The main difference is that instead of point values, we now use vectors as parameters of
the functions. The equilibrium price similarly is:
p ∈

m(q )
,
2W (s, {rt }t=1,...,T , σ)
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and it is unique iff W (s, {rt }t=1,...,T , σ) is a singleton. If W (s, {rt }t=1,...,T , σ) = Wc ,
then only consumer segments t = 1, ..., c purchase the product but not the segments t =
c+1, ..., T . As before, however, the optimal vendor proﬁt and optimal quality are non-zero,
ﬁnite, unique, and continuous in all the parameters.
We can interpret W (s, {rt }t=1,...,T , σ) as before. The term Wc expresses the weighted
average of

1
,
nt (s,rt )

where the weights correspond to the proportions of consumer segments

in the market. The term (

c
t =1

σt ) represents the market size of the consumers of the

segment t = 1, ..., c. The variations of the aggregated distrust factor, W (s, {rt }t=1,...,T , σ),
with respect to the exogenous parameters are also mostly the same. Hence, the results in
the main model hold regarding the price, quality, vendor proﬁt, and welfare metrics with
respect to exogenous parameters even with multiple consumer segments.

3.5.2

Ill-Informed Consumers Underestimate Software Quality

Earlier, we assume that ill-informed consumers observe a signal with only a positive
bias (i.e., they are overly optimistic about the security protection from the software). In
this subsection, we allow the bias to be negative (i.e., ill-informed consumers are now pessimistic about the quality of the security software and are not appreciative of the software).
Suppose ill-informed consumers perceive the quality of the software to be worse than its
actual quality. In other words, q̃1 = g(q; s) < q = q̃2 . Let

∂g
∂s

< 0.

Note that, as before, the consumers try to debias the perceived quality of the security
software. However, in this case, they suspect that the actual quality may be higher, as
opposed to lower, than the signal q̃t they receive. As a result of debiasing upward instead
of downward, the well-informed consumers exhibit higher perceived expected utility than
the ill-informed ones. Symmetric to the main model, if the bias size s becomes larger, well(ill-)informed consumers’ perceived expected utility shifts higher (lower). In the abstract
sense, similar to the main model, it results in one segment exhibiting larger demand while
the demand is smaller for another segment. For these reasons, all of our main results remain
qualitatively similar to the results generated by the main model.
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3.5.4 Endogenous choice of rt
In the main model, we assumed that the parameter rt , the weight that consumers place
on the debiased quality, is an exogenous parameter. In this subsection, we discuss an
extension where rt is endogenized. There are two possible entities in the model that can
inﬂuence rt : the vendor and the consumers. The vendor can possibly inﬂuence perceptions
through warning messages on the software or through articles accessed by the different
consumer segments. On the consumer side, it is possible that consumers somehow learn
about the scenario regarding their beliefs.
If the vendor can manipulate rt , it is obvious that the vendor always prefers rt = 0.
That is, the vendor wants consumers to believe naively in the perceived quality. On the
other hand, if every consumer myopically chooses rt , then we can prove that she will ﬁnd
it optimal to set rt = σ, independent of the segment she belongs to. In other words,
consumers weigh their possible biased observation as being equal to the true probability.
The welfare implications of these cases are not ex ante clear. When rt = σ as opposed
to rt = 0, consumer loss from the Peltzman-like effect is smaller. However, rt = σ leads
to lower quality product compared with the case where rt = 0 because the vendor has
to account for consumer suspicion of the software – the suspicion can be attributed to the
Akerlof-like effect. To study this further, we conducted a numerical analysis using the same
utility function as speciﬁed in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.6.: The parameter region where the social welfare is larger with rt = 0 or rt = σ.
Note: The utility function is u(x; β, q) =

√

βqx − λx. The cost function is c(q) =

kq 2
2

and

the quality perception is q̃1 = q(s + 1). Other parameters are set to be k = .1, λ = .05

Figure ?? demonstrates the social welfare comparison between the two cases. If the
bias or the proportion of ill-informed consumers is sufﬁciently large, the society is better
off when rt = σ compared with rt = 0. However, if both uncertainty parameters are small,
rt = 0 is better for social welfare. Interestingly, this result demonstrates that the case where
consumers know the probability of the signal being biased and set rt = σ accordingly is
not always the social optimal.

3.6 Discussions and Conclusions
In the information security context, decisions are often made without a clear understanding of the expected losses (because consumers often do not know the probability
and/or the value of the loss) suffered from breaches. The popular press as well as security
researchers have even documented this lack of clarity. Yet, prior works on the economics
of information security have not studied the welfare implications of such uncertainty with
respect to losses. In this paper, we study how bias in consumers’ estimation of software
quality impacts welfare outcomes. We do so by developing a game theoretic model. Our
model has two unique features. First, we model how some users observe signals regarding
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software quality with a positive bias. Second, all users – including the well- and illinformed consumers – engage in risky but value adding behavior based on their perception
of the software’s quality. We compute the equilibrium of our game and, based on that,
develop insights.
Our paper is the ﬁrst to demonstrate an interesting dynamic between two distinctive
effects – the Peltzmann- and Akerlof-like effects. The Akerlof-like effect, which occurs
when consumer perception of product quality is uncertain, causes the market to be unsustainable by deincentivizing the vendor in the market to improve quality. The Peltzman-like
effect drives consumers, who tend to overestimate the software quality, to engage in more
risky behavior. While those two effects seem to be both harmful to the consumer and social
welfare, the interaction between them can create surprising results such as when the social
welfare improves with bias. The reason is that the upward-bias of quality perception due
to the Peltzman-like effect serves as a beneﬁcial tool. It allows consumers to form a trust
in the quality of the security software and increases product demand. Consequently, the
vendor is encouraged to invest in improving the quality, which otherwise might not have
occurred in a market dominated by the Akerlof-like effect alone. Thus, in cases where
the loss from suboptimal consumer behavior can be offset by gain from higher quality, the
larger bias beneﬁts the consumer/social welfare.
In addition, our research yields many important practical implications at multiple levels.
At the individual consumer level, our paper highlights the Peltzman effect in the context
of information security. It models the consumers’ false perception of the software quality
and the consequently potentially dangerous impact on those purchasing security software.
Thereby, we account for possible differences between realized and perceived utilities. We
wish to highlight this difference as many ﬁrms in reality continue to believe that simply
adopting security software automatically yields a higher level of protection. When users
are overly optimistic about the software’s quality, the loss from the Peltzman-like effect
may be more severe than having no protection at all. In this regard, we emphasize the
importance of treating information security holistically by also investing in educating endusers in addition to implementing the security software. Lastly, for a policymaker, our
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model shows that simply reducing bias might not always beneﬁt society. On the other hand,
it could actually harm social welfare by collapsing the market. However, a scenario where
an increase in bias increases social welfare will not occurs if policymakers can educate
consumers about the informational structure of bias.
Given that this is the ﬁrst paper to have studied the welfare implications of information
uncertainty about losses, we have considered a rather simplistic setting. There are several
ways in which the model can be extended. An obvious extension is to consider a more competitive market, but we believe that the Peltzmann- and Akerlof-like effects will continue to
impact welfare. Another extension is to study the issue in the presence of negative network
externality – an aspect which has been considered in many recent papers using game theory
to study information security issues. The welfare implications of quality uncertainty in the
presence of a negative network effect of information security is more difﬁcult to predict.
Hence, it could be another potential avenue for future research.
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A. Detail of the simulation in Chapter 1
The dimension of the product characteristics on utility function Xjt is set to be 2, where the
ﬁrst characteristic is constant and the second is randomly generated independently across
products and periods. The cost side characteristics Yjt includes Xjt and one additional
characteristic also drawn independently. The characteristics are drawn from a normal
distribution of mean 0 and standard deviation .1. The unobserved error terms

jt

and

λjt are also drawn from a normal distribution of mean zero and standard deviation 1,
independently across products and markets. The true values of parameters other than price
coefﬁcient α are β = (2., 1.) and γ = (3., 0., 1.). Those values are chosen to ensure that
the marginal cost does not fall below zero, and the resulting share of outside option is not
too close to zero for the invertibility of Δ. Given the generated characteristics and the
errors, the prices are simulated by solving the proﬁt maximization problem by sequential
least square quadratic programming. The results are robust to variety of parameter setting
and distributional assumption.
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B. Detail of the estimation procedure in Chapter 1
B.1 Hyper parameter setting
The discounting factor β is set to be .9 for dynamic models both on demand and supply
side. The draw of consumer types is generated from Halton sequence. The number of
consumer segments is set to be 7. The initial market size Mij1 is deﬁned by the sum of
the sales over the considered period in the subcategory that j belongs to, divided by the
number of consumer segments.

B.2

Converting supply side constraints to FOC
The equilibrium constraints on supply side includes the retailer’s proﬁt maximization.

In the estimation, we substitute it by ﬁrst order condition. Let us deﬁne the derivative of
the demand function with respect to price,

m
∂Dijt
,
∂pjt

to be another set of endogenous variable

of MPEC that represents the derivative of the demand function from a consumer i of a
product j at period t evaluated at the realized price. Also deﬁne

m
∂Djt
∂pjt

be a derivative of the

overall demand function, again at the observed price. In static pricing model, the MPEC
constraints are converted to:
m
∂Dijt
m m
m
= Mijt
sijt (1 − sijt
)
∂pjt
m
∂Djt
∂Dijt (pjt )
=
∂pjt
∂pjt
i
Djt (pjt ) +

m
∂Djt
(pjt − M Cjt ) = 0
∂pjt

s
γ + λjt
M Cjt = Xjt

∀(j, t).
In dynamic pricing model, FOC include a derivative of the value function. In addition
to the ones above, we deﬁne two sets of additional endogenous variables: the realized value
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function of product j at period t, vjt , and the derivative of value function at next period with
respect to current price evaluated at the observed price,

∂Vjt+1
.
∂pjt

Then FOC and the Bellman

equations translate to MPEC constraints:
Djt (pjt ) +

m
∂Djt
∂Vjt
(pjt − M Cjt ) + β
=0
∂pjt
∂pjt

vjt = Djt (pjt − M Cjt ) + βvjt+1
∀(j, t).
As we do not parametrically estimate the value function, the difﬁculty arises to calculate
the derivative of the value function. The state variable at t + 1 that are inﬂuenced by pjt are
the market size of consumer segments Mijt+1 . Thus, deﬁne the derivative of the value with
respect to market size,

∂Vjt+1
,
∂Mijt+1

as another set of endogenous variable. Then,

∂Vjt+1
=
∂pjt

i

∂Vjt ∂Mijt+1
pjt
∂Mijt+1 ∂pj t

i

∂Vjt
∂Mijt+1

=
We still have to approximate

∂vjt
.
∂Mijt+1

∂Dijt (pjt )
−
∂pjt

(
.

One methodology is to utilize the estimated values

of vjt . The realized value vjt should be equal to the value function evaluated at the realized
state Ωjt . Therefore, by comparing vjt and Mijt , we are able to infer how value function
changes with respect to Mijt . In the estimation, we do so by linear approximation such as
(
∂Vjt
1
vjt+1 − vjt
vjt − vjt−1
=
+
.
2 Mijt+1 − Mijt Mijt − Mijt−1
∂Mijt+1
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C. Related work to Chapter 2
This section reviews the previous work on fairness-aware machine learning algorithms.Table
C.1 compares our algorithm with the existing ones.
These algorithms can be classiﬁed into two categories: Algorithms of the ﬁrst category process datapoints before or after putting them into classiﬁer or regressor. Such an

Table C.1.: List of fair estimators and their capabilities.

algorithms

categorical

numeric

explanatory classiﬁcation regression

sensitive

sensitive

attrs

attrs

attrs

Kamiran et al. (Kamiran and Calders, 2010)











Zliobaite et al. (Zliobaite et al., 2011)











Kamishima et al. (Kamishima et al., 2012b)











Calders et al. (Calders et al., 2013)











Zemel et al. (Zemel et al., 2013)











Fish et al. (Fish et al., 2015)











Feldman et al. (Feldman et al., 2015)











Zafar et al. (Zafar et al., 2017b)











This paper











Note: “Categorical sensitive attrs” indicates that an algorithm can deal with more than
binary sensitive variables. “Numeric sensitive attrs” indicates that an algorithm can deal
with continuous sensitive variables. “explanatory attrs” indicates that an algorithm utilizes
some variables that justify the treatment (e.g. the effect of working hours on wages)
(Zliobaite et al., 2011). The checkmark indicates the capability of the algorithm in the
corresponding aspect.
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algorithm typically transforms training datasets so as to remove any dependency between
the sensitive attribute and target attribute. The advantage of these algorithms is generality:
they can be combined with a larger class of off-the-shelf algorithms for classiﬁcation and
regression. Moreover, the transformed data can be considered as a “fair representation”
(Feldman et al., 2015) that is free from discrimination. The biggest downside of these
algorithms that they treat a classiﬁer as a black-box, and as a result, they need to change
the datapoints drastically, which tends to reduce accuracy. Regarding the algorithms of this
category, Kamiran et al. (Kamiran and Calders, 2010) proposed a data-debiasing scheme
by using a ranking algorithm. They were inspired by the idea that the datapoints close
to the class borderline are prone to discrimination, and they resample datapoints so as
to satisfy fairness constraints. Zliobaite et al. (Zliobaite et al., 2011) argued that some
part of discrimination is explainable by some attributes. They also proposed resampling
and relabelling methods that help in training fair classiﬁers. Zemel et al. (Zemel et al.,
2013) proposed a method to learn a discrete intermediate fair representation. Feldman et
al. (Feldman et al., 2015) considered a quantile-based transformation of each attribute.
Hardt et al. (Hardt et al., 2016) studied the condition of equalized odds, and provided a
post-processing method that fulﬁlls the condition.
Algorithms of the second category directly classify or regress datapoints. Such algorithms tend to perform well in practice since they do not need to conduct explicit data
transformation that loses some information. The downside of these algorithms is that
one needs to modify an existing classiﬁer for each task. Regarding the algorithms of
this approach, Ristanoski et al. (Ristanoski et al., 2013) proposed a version of support
vector machine (SVM), called SVMDisc, that involves a discrimination loss term. Fish et
al. (Fish et al., 2015) shifted the decision boundary of the classical AdaBoost algorithm
so that fairness is preserved. Goh et al. (Goh et al., 2016) considered a constrained
optimization that satisﬁes various constraints including the one of fairness. Kamishima
et al. (Kamishima et al., 2012b) proposed prejudice index and proposed a regularizer to
reduce prejudice. Zafar et al. (Zafar et al., 2017b) considered a constrained optimization
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for classiﬁcation tasks that maximizes accuracy (resp. fairness) subject to fairness (resp.
accuracy) constraint.
Our two-stage approach lies somewhere between the data preprocessing approach and
direct approach. The ﬁrst stage of 2SDR transforms datasets to make the classiﬁer or
regressor in the second stage fair. Unlike most data preprocessing algorithms, the transformation of the ﬁrst stage in 2SDR conducts the minimum amount of transformation
that is primarily intended for linear algorithms, and thus, it does not degrade the original
information by much. Moreover, any class of linear algorithm can be used in the second
stage, and as a result our algorithm can handle more diverse range of tasks and conditions
than the existing algorithms can.
Note that other tasks have been considered in the literature of fairness-aware machine
learning. To name a few, Kamishima et al. (Kamishima et al., 2012a; Kamishima et al.,
2016) considered methods for removing discrimination in recommendation tasks. Joseph
et al. (Joseph et al., 2016) considered fairness in the context of online content selection.
Bolukbasi et al. (Bolukbasi et al., 2016) considered fairness in dense word representation
learnt from text corpora.
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Table D.1.: List of regression or classiﬁcation datasets.

datasets

Regression

D

N

or Classiﬁcation
Adult

Classiﬁcation 49

45,222

Regression

101

1,994

Compas

Classiﬁcation 12

5,855

German

Classiﬁcation 47

1,000

LSAC

Classiﬁcation 24

20,798

Communities & Crime (C&C)

Note: D is the number of binary or numeric attributes (after expanding unordered
categorical attributes into dummies (i.e., set of binary dummy attributes)), and N is the
number of datapoints.

D. Summary of the datasets in the main analysis of Chapter 2
Table D.1 summarizes the datasets used in the main analysis.

D.1

Other Datasets in Chapter 2
Furthermore, we conducted additional experiments on two other datasets (Table D.2).

The ProPublica Compas dataset (Angwin et al., 2016) is a collection of criminal offenders
screened in Broward County, Florida during 2013-2014, where x is a demographic and
criminal record of offenders and y is whether or not a person recidivated within two years
after the screening. We set sex as the sensitive attribute s. The Law School Admissions
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Table D.2.: Results for the Compas and LSAC datasets.

Algorithm (Dataset)

P%-rule

Accuracy

OLS (Compas)

0.59

0.73

2SDR (Compas)

0.92

0.73

OLS (Compas-R)

0.19

0.65

2SDR (Compas-R)

0.93

0.65

OLS (LSAC)

0.21

0.75

2SDR (LSAC)

0.86

0.73

Note: We balanced training data by resampling in LSAC dataset to cope with class
inbalance problem.

Compas-R is a version of the Compas dataset where predictive

attributes are dropped: In this version, we dropped the attributes of the original dataset
whose correlation with y was stronger than 0.3. This signiﬁcantly reduces the prediction
accuracy and fairness of the OLS estimator which tries to utilize the available information
as much as possible. Unlike OLS, the fairness of 2SLS does not decrease even if these
attributes are dropped.

Council (LSAC) dataset

1

is a survey among students attending law schools in the U.S.

in 1991, where y indicates whether each student passed the ﬁrst bar examination. We
set whether or not the race of the student is black as the sensitive attribute. Similar to
the German dataset, we used 2/3 (resp. 1/3) of the datapoints as training (resp. testing)
datasets, and results are averaged over 100 runs. The results, shown in Table D.2 implies
that 2SDR complies with the 80%-rule with an insigniﬁcant deterioration in classiﬁcation
performance on these datasets.

1

http://www2.law.ucla.edu/sander/Systemic/Data.htm
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Table E.1.: Performance of 2SDR on the Adult dataset where s is (sex, age).

Algorithm P%-rule

CC

Accuracy

OLS

0.30

0.22

0.84

2SDR

0.65

0.10

0.82

Note: We show p%-rule (resp. correlation coefﬁcient, CC) with respect to sex (resp. age).
Both fairness criteria are improved by using 2SDR.

E. Other settings
This section shows results with several other settings.
Multiple s: Here, we report the result for multiple sensitive attributes. Table E.1 lists
the results for the Adult dataset, where s is sex (binary) and age (numeric). One can see
that (i) 2SDR reduces discrimination for both of sensitive attributes with a very small deterioration on the classiﬁcation performance, and (ii) the power of removing discrimination
is weaker than in the case of applying 2SDR to a single s.
Effect of ordinal transformation: The method proposed by Feldman et al. (Feldman
et al., 2015) conducts a quantile-based transformation. We have also combined the transformation with 2SDR. Let xi,(k) be the k-th attribute in xi . A quantile-based transformation
maps each attribute xi,(k) into its quantile rank among its sensitive attributes si :
Ranki,k =

j∈{1,2,...,n}:si =sj

I[xi,(k) > xi,(k) ]

|{j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : si = sj }|

.

(E.1)

Feldman et al. (Feldman et al., 2015) showed that the dependence between xi,(k) and s can
be removed by using such a quantile-based transformation (c.f. Figure 1 in Feldman et al.
(Feldman et al., 2015)). Table E.2 and E.3 list the results of applying the transformation
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Table E.2.: Classiﬁcation results for the Adult dataset, with or without the ordinal
transformation of Eq. (E.1).

Without ordinal trans.

With ordinal trans.

Algorithm

P%-rule

Accuracy

P%-rule

Accuracy

OLS

0.30

0.84

0.29

0.83

2SDR

0.83

0.82

0.82

0.82

OLS (cont. only)

0.22

0.81

0.06

0.80

2SDR (cont. only)

0.88

0.79

0.87

0.78

Note: “With ordinal trans.”

(resp.

“Without ordinal trans.”)

indicates an ordinal

transformation is conducted (resp. is not conducted) for each attribute. ”cont. only”
indicates that non-numeric attributes in x are discarded beforehand.

Table E.3.: Regression results for the C&C dataset.

Without ordinal trans.

With ordinal trans.

Algorithm

MD

RMSE

MD

RMSE

OLS

0.22

0.14

0.23

0.16

2SDR

0.02

0.18

0.02

0.19

of Eq. (E.1) for each non-binary attribute. Applying an ordinal transformation slightly
decreased accuracy (or increased RMSE in regression), as it discards the modal information
on the original attribute.
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Table E.4.: Classiﬁcation result of 2SDR combined with logistic regression.

Algorithm

dataset

P%-rule

Accuracy

2SDR

Adult

0.72

0.83

2SDR

German

0.80

0.73

Generalized linear models: We also tried logistic regression in the second stage
classiﬁer. Logistic regression is a binary classiﬁcation model that assumes the following
relation between the attributes xi and target yi :
P[yi = 1|xi ] =

1
,
1 + e−xi β

(E.2)

where β is the model parameter to be learnt. Table E.4 shows the results of classiﬁcation
when we replaced the second-stage classiﬁer with the logistic regression. Compared with a
linear model (Ridge classiﬁer), this yielded a lower p%-rule in the Adult dataset. This fact
is consistent with Theorem 2.4.2. It states that u is asymptotically uncorrelated to s: However, a non-linear map such as the sigmoid function in Eq. (E.2) can cause bias between
the mapped u and s. We should also note that the more involved non-linear second stage
classiﬁers, such as naive Bayes classiﬁers, support vector machines, and gradient boosting
machines, resulted in a signiﬁcantly lower p%-rule than logistic regression because of their
strong non-linearity.
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F. Proof of Lemmas and Propositions in Chapter 3
F.1

Proof of Lemma 3.3.1 (on Page 82)

Lemma 3.3.1 For a given β, the perceived expected utility is higher for the ill-informed
consumer than for the well-informed one. Hence, the market share from the well-informed
consumers is smaller than or equal to that from ill-informed ones. That is, Ũ1 > Ũ2 and
β2 ≥ β1 .
Proof We prove the ﬁrst part initially:
Ũ1 = (1 − r1 )u(x; q̃1 , β) + r1 u(x; g −1 (q̃1 ; s), β)
= (1 − r1 )u(x; g(q; s), β) + r1 u(x; q, β)
> (1 − r1 )u(x; q, β) + r1 u(x; q, β)
= u(x; q, β)
= (1 − r2 )u(x; q, β) + r2 u(x; q, β)
> (1 − r2 )u(x; q, β) + r2 u(x; g −1 (q; s), β)
= (1 − r2 )u(x; q̃2 , β) + r2 u(x; g −1 (q̃2 ; s), β)
= U˜2 .
Both inequalities hold because the utility is increasing in quality and g −1 (q; s) < q <
g(q; s). It proves the ﬁrst part of the lemma. Next,
max U˜1 = U˜1 (x1 ) > Ũ1 (x2 ) > Ũ2 (x2 ) = max U˜2 .
x

x

(F.1)

The ﬁrst inequality comes from the unique optima and the second is from the ﬁrst part of
the lemma.
Given Equation F.1, it is obvious that β2 > β1 since
Uno (β1 ) = Ũ1 (β1 , q) > Ũ2 (β1 , q),
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which means that a consumer whose β is at β1 does not purchase the product if she belongs
to t = 2.

F.2

Proof of Lemma 3.3.2 (on Page 83)

Lemma 3.3.2 m(q) is a continuous, differentiable, and strictly increasing function of q.
nt (s, rt ) is a continuous and differentiable function of s and rt .
and

∂nt (s,rt )
∂rt

∂n1 (s,r1 )
∂s

> 0;

∂n2 (s,r2 )
∂s

< 0;

≤ 0 for t = {1, 2} but the inequality is strict only if s > 0. The utility from not

purchasing the security software, Uno (β) = 0 for any β.
Proof Recall that from Equation 3.3, we have
βm(q)nt (s, rt ) = max Ũt = Ũt

(F.2)

x

Ũt = (1 − rt )u(x; q̃t , β) + rt u(x; g −1 (q̃t ; s), β).

(F.3)

It is clear that the function on the right hand side is a continuous differentiable function of
q, s and rt . Therefore, we can apply the envelope theorem to imply that m(q) and nt (s, rt )
are continuous and differentiable.
To compute

∂nt (s,rt )
,
∂s

we invoke the envelope theorem, Following that,

∂Ũ1
∂u(x1 ; g(q; s), β) ∂g(q; s)
= (1 − r1 )
.
∂s
∂q
∂s
Note that, by assumption,
Equation F.2,
∂g −1 (q;s)
∂s

∂n1 (s,r1 )
∂s

∂u(x∗1 ;g(q;s),β)
∂q

> 0 and

∂g(q;s)
∂s

> 0. Consequently, because of

> 0. The proof is similar to establishing that

∂n2 (s,r2 )
∂s

< 0 because

< 0.

If s = 0, for t = {1, 2}, we can also apply the envelope theorem:
∂Ũt
= −u(xt ; q̃t , β) + u(xt ; g −1 (q̃t ; s), β).
∂rt
Because u(x, q, β) is a strictly increasing function of q and q̃t > g −1 (q̃t ; s),
Hence,

∂nt (s,rt )
∂rt

< 0.

∂Ũt∗
∂rt

< 0.
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Next, we prove that Uno = maxx u(x; 0, β) = 0. Since m(0) = 0 by assumption,
βm(0)n2 (s, r2 ) = 0 = max r2 u(x; g −1 (0; s), β) + (1 − r2 )u(x; 0, β) ≤ max u(x; 0, β)
x

x

βm(0)n1 (s, r1 ) = 0 = max (r1 u(x; 0, β) + (1 − r1 )u(x; g(0; s), β)) ≥ max u(x; 0, β)
x

x

0 ≤ maxx u(x; 0, β) ≤ 0. Thus, maxx u(x; 0, β) = 0.

F.3

Proof of Proposition 3.4.1 (on Page 85)

Proposition 3.4.1 The optimal vendor proﬁt and optimal quality are non-zero, ﬁnite, unique,
and continuous in all the parameters s, rt , and σt . The equilibrium price is:
p ∈

m(q )
,
2W (s, r1 , r2 , σ)

and it is unique iff W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) is a singleton. If W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) = W1 , only the illinformed consumers are served; if W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) = W2 , both well- and ill-informed
consumers are served. The implicit function that ﬁnds the unique optimal quality is
m (q )
4

t

σt

Wt−1 − c (q ) = 0 if Wt ∈ W (s, r1 , r2 , σ).

t =1

Proof
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
p (1 − σ)(1 − m(q)np2 (s,r2 ) ) + σ(1 −
⎪
⎪
p
π = pσ 1 −
− c(q)
m(q)n1 (s,r1 )
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩−c(q)

p
)
m(q)n1 (s,r1 )

− c(q)

if 0 < p ≤ m(q)n2 (s, r2 )

if m(q)n2 (s, r2 ) < p ≤ m(q)n1 (s, r1 )
if p > m(q)n1 (s, r2 ).

The proﬁt function is clearly a continuous function. We then demonstrate that the equilibrium price and quality are bounded. Recall that the feasible ranges are q ∈ [0, ∞) and
p ∈ [0, ∞). If p > m(q)n1 (s, r1 ), π ≤ 0 with the inequality being strict for q > 0. Now,
consider q = > 0 and p = m(q)n2 (s, r2 ). Then,
(
n2 (s, r2 )
− c( )
π = σn2 (s, r2 )m( ) 1 −
n1 (s, r1 )
(
∂π
n2 (s, r2 )
= σn2 (s, r2 )m ( ) 1 −
− c ( ).
∂
n1 (s, r1 )
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Recall that lim →0 c ( ) = 0. From Lemma 3.3.2, lim →0 m ( ) > 0. Therefore lim →0

∂π
∂

>

0. It implies that there exists an > 0 such that π > 0. Hence, p ≤ m(q)n1 (s, r1 ).
For a given q, π ≤ m(q)n1 (s, r1 ) − c(q) because p ≤ m(q)n1 (s, r1 ) and D(p, q) ≤ 1.
Note that, by assumptions that m(q) is concave and c(q) is convex in q, m(q)n1 (s, r1 ) −
c(q) is strictly concave in q. Also, from the assumptions, m(0)n1 (s, r1 ) − c(0) = 0,
m (0)n1 (s, r1 ) − c (0) > 0, and limq→∞ m(q)n1 (s, r1 ) − c(q) = ∞. It implies that q̄ > 0,
m(q̄)n1 (s, r1 ) − c(q̄) = 0 and m (q)n1 (s, r1 ) − c (q) < 0 for q ≥ q̄. Therefore, as a follow
up to the ﬁrst statement, π < 0 for q > q̄. So, q ∈ [0, q̄].
From Weirstrauss’ theorem, an optimal solution exists since the objective function is
continuous and the feasible region is closed and continuous. By Fermat’s theorem, the
optimal solution can lie only on boundaries, non-differentiable points, or stationary points
(obtained from the ﬁrst order conditions). Boundaries p = 0 and p = m(q)n1 (s, r1 ) can be
ruled out since π ≤ 0 and we can argue along the lines of the previous paragraphs that those
prices are infeasible as optimal solutions to our problem. Similarly, the proﬁt generated
by the stationary points are at least as much as when price is at the discontinuity point
(m(q)n2 (s, r2 )). So, the optimal price must belong to the set p1 =
p = p1 , the resulting proﬁt is π1 =

m(q)σ
−c(q); and
4W1
1
Now we compare π1 and π2 . Suppose
t =1 σt
2
t =1

m(q)
, p2
2W1

=

at p = p2 , the proﬁt is π2 =
W1−1 = σn1 (s, r1 ) >

σ
n1 (s,r1 )

σt W2−1 . Then, π1 > π2 . In this case, p1 > m(q)n2 (s, r2 ) is satisﬁed:
(−1
σ
1−σ
+
σn1 (s, r1 ) >
n1 (s, r1 ) n2 (s, r2 )
1
1−σ
σ
⇔
<
+
n2 (s, r2 ) n1 (s, r1 )
σn1 (s, r1 )
n1 (s, r1 )
⇔ 1 < (1 − σ)σ
+ σ2
n2 (s, r2 )
⇔ (1 − σ 2 )n2 (s, r2 ) < (1 − σ)σn1 (s, r1 )
⇔1+

1
n2 (s, r2 ) < n1 (s, r1 )
σ

⇒ 2n2 (s, r2 ) < n1 (s, r1 ) (∵ σ < 1)
⇔ m(q)n2 (s, r2 ) <

m(q)n1 (s, r1 )
= p1
2

m(q)
. At
2W2
m(q)
−c(q).
4W2

+

1−σ
n2 (s,r2 )

−1

=
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Thus the stationary point p = p1 exists and it is the equilibrium price.
σt W1−1 >

1
t =1

Similarly, when

2
t =1

σt W2−1 , the stationary point p = p2 is

the equilibrium price. Finally, when W1 = W2 , both p = p1 and p = p2 are valid as
stationary points.
Lastly, we show that the continuity of equilibrium outcome with respect to the parameters s, rt , and σ. It is clear that W is a continuous function of all the parameters. Thus,
the equilibrium quality and proﬁt (which are deﬁned by continuous implicit function of W )
are also continuous in parameters. The same holds for the price except for the case where
W1 = W 2 .

F.4

Proof of Lemma 3.4.1 (on Page 85)

Lemma 3.4.1 Wt ∈ W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) is non decreasing in rt and non increasing in σ.
With respect to s, the function decreases when W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) = W1 but may increase
or decrease when W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) = W2 .
Proof First we show the result regarding rt . Because W is continuous, it is sufﬁcient that
we show

∂W1
∂r

> 0 and

∂W2
∂r

> 0.
∂W1
∂r1
∂W1
∂r2
∂W2
∂r1
∂W2
∂r2

From Lemma 3.3.2,

∂nt (s,rt )
∂rt

= −

1
∂n1 (s, r1 )
2
σn1 (s, r1 )
∂r1

= 0
σ
∂n1 (s, r1 )
n1 (s, r1 )2
∂r1
1 − σ ∂n2 (s, r2 )
= −
σn2 (s, r2 )
∂r2

= −

≤ 0. Thus all the four equations are greater than zero.

Similarly, with respect to σ:
∂W1
= 0
∂σ
1
1
∂W2
= −
+
.
∂σ
n2 (s, r2 ) n1 (s, r1 )

128
The ﬁrst equation is (weakly) less than zero. The second is less than zero because n2 (s, r2 ) ≤
n1 (s, r1 ) from Lemma 3.3.1.
Lastly, we show the result with respect to s. If W1 < W2 , W = W1 and
1
∂n1 (s, r1 )
∂W1
=−
≤0
∂s
∂s
n1 (s, r1 )2
from Lemma 3.3.2. If W1 > W2 , W = W2 and
σ
∂n1 (s, r1 )
1 − σ ∂n2 (s, r2 )
∂W2
=−
−
.
2
2
∂s
n1 (s, r1 )
∂s
∂s
n2 (s, r2 )
From Lemma 3.3.2, limσ→0

∂W2
∂s

∂n2 (s,r2 )
1
= − n2 (s,r
≥ 0 and limσ→1
2
∂s
2)

∂W2
∂s

∂n1 (s,r1 )
1
= − n1 (s,r
≤
2
∂s
1)

0

F.5

Proof of Theorem 3.4.1 (on Page 86)

Theorem 3.4.1 When the parameters change, the following hold at the equilibrium.
1. If rt increases (equivalently, decreases): the quality and the proﬁt decrease (increase); if the price is a singleton, it also decreases (increases).
2. If σ increases (decreases): the quality and the proﬁt increase (decrease); if the price
is a singleton, it also increases (decrease).
3. If s increases: the proﬁt, quality, and price may decrease.
Proof From Lemma 3.4.1, we know the sensitivity of Wt ∈ W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) with respect
to the exogenous parameters. Hence, we only need to show the equilibrium changes with
Wt ∈ W (s, r1 , r2 , σ).
First, we show that q is decreasing in Wt ∈ W (s, r1 , r2 , σ). Recall that the equilibrium
t
m (q ∗ )
t =1
4Wt
t
Wt
t =1 σt

quality satisﬁes
So,

m (q ∗ )
4c (q ∗ )

=

σt

− c (q ) = 0 for Wt ∈ W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) and is unique.

for Wt ∈ W (s, r1 , r2 , σ). Since we assumed m(q) to be

concave and c(q) convex, m (q) is decreasing; but c (q) is always increasing in q. So,

m (q ∗ )
c (q ∗ )

decreases as q increases. It implies that if the right hand side increases, the equilibrium
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quality decreases. When s and rt change, the treatment is straightforward because the right
hand side directly changes with W . We then consider the case of σt next.
Consider the case W2 ∈ W (s, r1 , r2 , σ). The right hand side can be substituted as
2
t=1

σt = 1. Thus, q increases when W2 decreases. If W1 = 1/ni (s, ri ) ∈ W (s, r1 , r2 , σ),

the right hand side is σW1 . In this case, W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) is independent of σ, and q increases
when W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) decreases.
Regarding the price, recall that the price is p =

m(q ∗ )
.
2W (s,r1 ,r2 ,σ)

Suppose Wt ∈ W (s, r1 , r2 , σ)

increases. From the previous argument, we know that m(q ) increases. So the numerator
increases and denominator decreases. Thus p decreases.
The proﬁt can be written as

m(q ∗ )
4W (s,r1 ,r2 ,σ)

t
t =1

σt − c(q ) in any case. By applying

the envelope theorem, the proﬁt decreases if Wt ∈ W (s, r1 , r2 , σ) increases.

F.6

Proof of Theorem 3.4.2 (on Page 90)

Theorem 3.4.2 Social welfare can increase with the amount of bias.
Proof Let the utility function be u(x; β, q) =

√

βqx − λx and the quality perception be

q̃1 = q(s + 1). The ﬁrst term is the beneﬁt consumers obtain from the risky behavior,
and the second term is the cost associated with the risky behavior. The beneﬁt is assumed
to be concave, and the cost is assumed to be linear. The consumers are assumed to be
heterogeneous in the beneﬁt but not in the cost. This speciﬁcation satisﬁes the assumptions
we made in the section 3.2. To show it also satisﬁes the separability assumption in 3.2.1,
ﬁrst the expected utility for the ill-informed consumers is
EU1 = r1

βqx − λx + (1 − r1 )

From the ﬁrst order condition, xi =

βq
4λ2

βq(1 + s)x − λx .

r1 + (1 − r1 )

2

(1 + s) . The optimal

expected utility is:
q
r1 + (1 − r1 )
4λ
≡ βm(q)n1 (s, r1 ).

EU1 = β ·

(1 + s)

2
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Similarly, the expected utility of well-informed consumers can be written as EU2 = βm(q)n2 (s, r2 )
(2
r
2
+ (1 − r2 ) .
where n2 (s, r2 ) = √
(1+s)

The social welfare expression is extensive, but
∂SW
∂s

=
s=0

∂SW
∂s

at s = 0 can be simpliﬁed as

σ − r1 σ − r2 (1 − σ)
,
1024kλ2

which can be positive if r1 and r2 are sufﬁciently small. For example, the parameter we
used for ﬁgure 3.2(b) (σ, r1 , r2 ) = (.6, .2, .2) satisﬁes this condition. Therefore, when s is
increased from zero, the social welfare may improve. It implies that the social welfare can
increase with the amount of bias.

F.7

Proof of Theorem 3.4.3 (on Page 92)

Theorem 3.4.3 There exist scenarios where social and consumer welfare are higher without security software in the market.
Proof We use the same speciﬁcation as mentioned in the proof of Theorem 3.4.2. The
social welfare is zero if there is no market for the security software. Thus, we only have
to show that there exists a set of parameters with which the social welfare is negative. For
example, let (s, σ, r1 , r2 , k, λ) = (3, .5, .1, .1, 1, .05). The social welfare evaluated at this
point is approximately −.203. Therefore, there exists a case where the social welfare is
smaller with market than without market.
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